On February 28, 2008, President Mwai Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga signed the National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement, creating a power-sharing government of national unity that would govern Kenya until 2013. The accord created the office of Prime Minister (abolished in 1964) and vested it in Raila, making him the second-highest executive authority in the country. Cabinet positions were divided between Kibaki's Party of National Unity (PNU) and Raila's Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), with ministerial seats distributed roughly 1:1 between the two camps. The accord effectively ended the active phase of the 2007-08 Post-Election Violence, though sporadic killings and ethnic tensions continued for weeks afterward. The agreement represented a compromise in which neither side won outright victory, though both claimed success.
The ministerial carve-up reflected the necessity of accommodating large numbers of political actors with claims to executive positions. The compromise created a bloated cabinet with 42 ministries (far more than the typical 15-20 in other governments), with many positions duplicated or functionally overlapping. Vice ministerial positions were added to distribute patronage further. The result was a cabinet more focused on maintaining ethnic and factional balance than on effective governance. Ministers from the same portfolio (for example, two ministers with agricultural responsibility) sometimes worked at cross-purposes. Resources were stretched thin, and the coordination problems were severe. However, the bloated cabinet was seen as a necessary price for political stability and preventing renewed violence.
The Grand Coalition's effectiveness was immediately questioned. The office of Prime Minister was not well-defined constitutionally; Kibaki as president retained ultimate authority over the state, while Raila as PM had undefined executive powers. This ambiguity led to frequent conflict between the two offices. Kibaki made unilateral appointments and policy decisions without consulting Raila; Raila's office issued orders that contradicted presidential directives. The civil service became paralyzed, unsure which leader to follow. International observers noted that the government was dysfunctional, with the two executives pulling in different directions. Yet the dysfunction, while inefficient, also prevented either side from consolidating power and eliminating the other. The deadlock itself maintained balance.
Substantively, what did the National Accord achieve beyond stopping the killing? The accord did not overturn the election results or acknowledge that Kibaki's victory was fraudulent; it accepted the electoral outcome while providing the opposition with executive power. This compromise allowed both sides to move on from the electoral dispute without either conceding defeat. The accord also established several important processes: (1) a taskforce to investigate the violence and produce recommendations, (2) a constitutional review commission to draft a new constitution, (3) a pipeline for transitional justice mechanisms. The accord's success lay not in resolving the underlying disputes but in creating space for longer-term institutional reform.
The constitutional review process, mandated by the accord, produced the 2010 Constitution, which addressed many of PEV's structural causes. The new constitution devolved power to 47 counties, creating a federal system that decentralized resource control and reduced the winner-takes-all pressure of a centralized presidency. It created an independent judiciary with a Supreme Court capable of reviewing election results (as would occur in 2017). It established a new electoral commission (IEBC) with reformed independence and transparency requirements. It included a comprehensive bill of rights and created mechanisms for transitional justice and truth-telling (the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission). All of these reforms flowed from the accord's mandate to "ensure Kenya never experiences such violence again."
The Grand Coalition government lasted until 2013, when the next election concluded. During those five years, relations between Kibaki and Raila deteriorated gradually. The promised constitutional reforms were implemented slowly, with political actors sometimes obstructing change that would reduce their power. By 2012-2013, as the end of Kibaki's constitutional limit approached (he could not run for reelection), both Raila and Uhuru Kenyatta (Kibaki's heir apparent) began positioning for the 2013 election. The coalition fragmented as the shared interest in preventing violence receded and electoral competition returned. In March 2013, elections were held and Uhuru Kenyatta won, ending the Grand Coalition. Raila's brief tenure as Prime Minister (2008-2013) had provided him with executive experience and some policy achievements, but it had not elevated him to the presidency, his ultimate goal.
See Also
Grand Coalition 2010 Constitution Kofi Annan Mediation 41 Days Timeline 2013 Election Echo
Sources
- Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence in Kenya." Nairobi, 2008. Pages 460-500 detail the National Accord and its terms.
- International Crisis Group. "Kenya: What Happens Next?" Africa Report No. 146, October 2008. Analysis of the accord's implementation and constitutional reform prospects. https://www.crisisgroup.org/
- Moran, Mary. "Political Settlements and Constitutional Design: The Kenyan Experience." Journal of Eastern African Studies, Volume 7, Issue 3, 2013. Available at https://www.tandfonline.com/