The 2013 presidential election was held on March 4, 2013, with both major ICC indictees (Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto) as leading candidates. The election was dubbed the "ICC election" because it represented a direct test of whether voters would elect individuals under indictment for crimes against humanity. International observers warned that electing Uhuru or Ruto would undermine international justice and send a message that political violence carried no consequences. However, Kenya's voters proceeded to elect Uhuru Kenyatta (paired with running mate William Ruto) with 50.27 percent of the vote in a narrowly contested election. The outcome was historic: an ICC indictee had become president while charges were pending, a situation without precedent in international justice history.
The 2013 election proceeded peacefully, a dramatic contrast to 2007-08. Death tolls were minimal (fewer than 20, mostly from isolated incidents rather than organized violence). Displacement was negligible. The peaceful outcome was attributed to multiple factors: reformed electoral institutions (IEBC, independent courts), international pressure (warnings of renewed sanctions), political learning (elites having observed 2007-08 costs), and Uhuru-Ruto coalition's dominance (reducing electoral uncertainty for their base). The 2013 election thus demonstrated that institutional reform and political learning could prevent recurrence of large-scale electoral violence, even in a context of ethnic tensions and disputed results.
The election reflected PEV's long-term impact on Kenyan voting patterns. Voting in 2013 was extremely ethnically polarized, with voters supporting candidates from their own ethnic groups. Uhuru (Kikuyu) and Ruto (Kalenjin) benefited from Kikuyu and Kalenjin mobilization, while Raila (Luo) and Kalonzo Musyoka (Kamba) led in their respective communities. Ethnic voting had existed in Kenya before 2007, but 2007-08 had hardened ethnic identities and political alignments. The result was that 2013 voting showed clear ethnic blocs, with minimal cross-ethnic coalition-building. This ethnic polarization in voting could itself be an echo of 2007-08 violence, suggesting that the underlying ethnic tensions had persisted rather than being resolved by constitutional reform.
The Supreme Court challenge to the 2013 election results was filed by Raila Odinga, alleging irregularities. However, the Supreme Court upheld the election, finding no basis for annulment. This outcome was seen as validating the new constitutional court, which had exercised genuine judicial review without being swayed by political pressure. The court's decision to uphold (rather than nullify) the election was itself a change from 2007, when courts had not seriously reviewed electoral disputes. The 2013 court validation of the election allowed Uhuru to take office and for the political elite to move forward with governance.
Yet the 2013 election also revealed gaps in institutional reform. Despite the IEBC and other reforms, observers noted irregularities in voting, ballot distribution, and tallying. Raila and opposition figures alleged bias by the IEBC. The election outcome (Uhuru-Ruto both ICC indictees winning) suggested that voters were willing to overlook justice concerns if they believed their ethnic candidate would benefit them. The 2013 election thus demonstrated both the success of institutional reform in preventing violence and its limitations in addressing underlying ethnic polarization and justice deficit.
See Also
2010 Constitution ICC Uhuru Case New IEBC 2017 Election Echo Impunity
Sources
- International Crisis Group. "Kenya: Can the Crisis Be Contained?" Africa Report No. 140, February 2008; updated analysis for 2013 available at https://www.crisisgroup.org/
- Carter Center. "Observing Kenya's 2013 General Elections." Atlanta, 2013. Available at https://www.cartercenter.org/
- International Criminal Court. "Situation in the Republic of Kenya." Updates on Uhuru case during 2013 election cycle. https://www.icc-cpi.int/