The devolution of power to 47 counties in the 2010 Constitution was explicitly designed as a response to the 2007-08 Post-Election Violence. The theory underlying devolution was straightforward: if power and resources were concentrated at the national level, then control of the presidency was winner-takes-all, and ethnic groups would mobilize violently to contest elections with existential stakes. Conversely, if power and resources were distributed to counties, the stakes of presidential elections would be reduced, and ethnic competition would be mediated through local political contests where power could be shared more easily. Devolution thus represented a structural answer to PEV's root cause: a hyper-centralized state where the presidency was the only prize that mattered.
Devolution transferred significant authority to county governments. Counties were given control over: primary and secondary education, health services (except specialized hospitals), county infrastructure, local commerce and industry, trade licensing, cultural institutions, and county revenue sources (including local taxation). The national government retained control over foreign affairs, defense, currency, and nation-wide strategic services. This distribution was intended to give communities genuine say in local affairs while maintaining a functional national state. By allowing 47 different governance experiments, devolution was also intended to allow policy diversity and local innovation.
The impact of devolution on election violence was mixed. The 2013 election, held after the new constitution, proceeded peacefully despite ethnic tensions. This outcome was attributed partly to devolution, which had reduced the stakes of the presidential race for some voters concerned with local development. However, devolution had also created new competitive arenas (county elections) where violence could occur. The 2017 election, while not as violent as 2007-08, did see violence during the re-run period, suggesting that devolution alone had not eliminated the potential for electoral violence. The 2022 election proceeded without major violence, but whether this reflected devolution's efficacy or other factors (learning from past violence, security force restraint, genuine constitutional acceptance) remained debated.
The implementation of devolution proved challenging. Many counties lacked the administrative capacity to manage services effectively. Corruption in county government was rampant; officials misappropriated funds, and service delivery suffered. The relationship between county and national governments was sometimes adversarial; county leaders from opposition parties clashed with national government. Fiscal transfers from the national government to counties were sometimes manipulated; ruling coalition counties received more resources than opposition areas, creating new grievances. These practical problems meant that devolution did not deliver the promised benefits (local empowerment, service improvement, conflict reduction) as cleanly as theory had suggested.
Yet devolution persisted and, by 2026, had become institutionalized despite problems. Counties held their own elections, elected governors and county assemblies, and made policy decisions affecting their populations. Local political competition had shifted from national zero-sum contests to contests that sometimes allowed coalition-building across ethnic lines at the local level. Some counties achieved significant service improvements and development. Others remained dysfunctional. The overall effect was that devolution had changed Kenya's political geography without eliminating the potential for ethnic or electoral violence. By 2026, devolution was seen as one institutional innovation among many that had modestly contributed to Kenya's relative stability post-2008, but it had not resolved the underlying social inequalities or resource competitions that had driven 2007-08 violence.
See Also
2010 Constitution 2013 Election Echo 2017 Election Echo Land Unresolved Grand Coalition
Sources
- Kenya Law. "The Constitution of Kenya, 2010." Chapter Five: Devolution and County Governments. Available at https://www.kenyalaw.org/
- Dickovick, Tyler. "Decentralization and Accountability: Are Smaller Really Better?" Journal of Democracy, Volume 22, Issue 2, 2011. Available at https://muse.jhu.edu/
- Mold, Andrew. "Federalism and Conflict Reduction in East Africa." OECD Development Centre Papers, 2012. Available at https://www.oecd.org/