The 2007-08 Post-Election Violence unfolded over exactly 41 days, from December 30, 2007, to February 28, 2008. This timeline traces the escalation curve, key turning points, and the progression from electoral dispute to mediation to power-sharing agreement.
December 30, 2007, Dusk (Day 1): ECK Chairman Samuel Kivuitu announces that incumbent President Mwai Kibaki has won the disputed election, with unofficial results showing Raila Odinga's National Democratic Alliance as the leading coalition. The margin is narrow enough to be contestable. Kibaki is immediately sworn in in a closed ceremony at State House garden without media broadcast, raising the symbolic and practical stakes. Raila's political operatives declare the election stolen.
December 31, 2007 (Day 2): Mass protests erupt in Nairobi, Kisumu, and Nakuru, with youth burning tires and barricading streets. Police respond with live ammunition in Kisumu; at least 15 killed. In Nairobi, Kibera and Mathare experience first gang clashes; the protest atmosphere shifts toward ethnic targeting. By evening, at least 50 people have been killed nationwide. The government declares a curfew in affected areas.
January 1, 2008 (Day 3): The Kiambaa church massacre occurs near Eldoret at approximately 3:30 PM; at least 35 killed. The image of the burned church is broadcast worldwide within hours, shocking international audiences and raising the crisis's global profile. Simultaneously, Rift Valley towns (Eldoret, Nakuru, Burnt Forest) experience escalating militia attacks. By midnight, at least 200 people have been killed cumulatively.
January 2-6, 2008 (Days 4-8): Violence intensifies exponentially. Rift Valley militia groups, now organized and armed, conduct systematic attacks on non-Kalenjin neighborhoods. Nakuru experiences multiple massacres; Eldoret's Luo and Kikuyu enclaves are targeted. Nairobi gang warfare escalates; police killings in Kibera and Mathare spike. Naivasha experiences first attacks on Luo and Kalenjin residents (the Naivasha reprisals occur January 27-28, but preparatory attacks begin this week). By January 6, cumulative deaths reach approximately 600-700.
January 7-21, 2008 (Days 9-22): Violence plateaus at high intensity without significant international intervention. Daily killings continue (estimated 50-100 daily). International organizations (ICRC, UN, NGOs) deploy to assess the situation and provide humanitarian assistance. Kenyan civil society calls for dialogue, but political parties remain entrenched. The government rejects international mediation offers initially. By January 21, cumulative deaths reach approximately 1,000-1,100.
January 22, 2008 (Day 23): Kofi Annan, former UN Secretary-General, arrives in Nairobi to begin mediation. His arrival marks the formal beginning of structured negotiation. The African Union Panel, consisting of Annan, Benjamin Mkapa (former Tanzania president), and Graca Machel (former Mozambique first lady), begins meetings with Kibaki and Odinga separately. Their goal is to establish a framework for dialogue. Violence does not cease but begins a slight downward trajectory as rumors of mediation suggest potential for settlement.
January 23-26, 2008 (Days 24-27): Mediation intensifies. Annan meets separately with Kibaki and Odinga; both agree in principle to dialogue but remain far apart on preconditions. Kibaki's position is that the election is final and cannot be reopened; Odinga's position is that the election was stolen and Kibaki has no legitimacy. The international community (US, EU, AU) increases pressure on both sides, with warnings of sanctions and ICC investigation. Violence continues at moderate levels (estimated 30-50 daily deaths). Internally displaced persons in camps on Nairobi's periphery swell to approximately 300,000.
January 27-28, 2008 (Days 28-29): The Naivasha reprisals occur, with Kikuyu Mungiki militias attacking Luo and Kalenjin residents. At least 31 killed, hundreds of homes burned. The reprisal demonstrates that violence is now bidirectional; not only are Rift Valley Kalenjin attacking non-Kalenjin, but Kikuyu militias in central Kenya and environs are retaliating against Luo and Kalenjin. This pattern suggests the potential for the violence to spread into central Kenya proper and escalate further. International pressure on Kibaki increases; the US explicitly warns of ICC investigation and potential economic sanctions.
January 29 - February 20, 2008 (Days 30-51, extending past the 41-day mark): Mediation moves forward slowly. Annan and the AU Panel propose a framework for power-sharing, with the presidency and a new Prime Minister position. Negotiations stall repeatedly over ministerial positions, constitutional amendments, and the mechanism for implementing the agreement. Both sides fear conceding advantage. Violence continues at moderate levels (estimated 20-40 daily deaths). International isolation of Kenya deepens; the European Union signals potential withdrawal of aid; the US increases ICC investigation pressure.
February 28, 2008 (Day 41): The National Accord and National Reconciliation Agreement is signed by Kibaki and Odinga, establishing a Grand Coalition government. Odinga becomes Prime Minister; Kibaki remains President. A power-sharing cabinet is announced, with ministerial positions divided between the two camps roughly proportional to their electoral bases. The signing of the accord does not immediately stop violence, but it provides a framework for it. Over the following days and weeks, militia groups gradually stand down, though some areas experience lingering violence through March and into April.
Key Escalation Points: December 30 (election announcement), December 31-January 1 (mass protests and first massacres), January 2-6 (militia coordination becomes evident), January 7-21 (violence plateaus at high intensity), January 22 (mediation begins), January 23-February 27 (mediation period with ongoing violence), February 28 (accord signed).
Key De-Escalation Drivers: International pressure (threat of ICC, sanctions, aid withdrawal), Kofi Annan's mediation and legitimacy, both sides' exhaustion and recognition that military victory was unlikely, elite deal-making around power-sharing, the absence of external actors (no neighboring states providing weapons or support).
See Also
2007-08 Post-Election Violence Hub Kibaki Swearing-In Eldoret Church Massacre Kofi Annan Mediation National Accord
Sources
- Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence in Kenya." Nairobi, 2008. Pages 50-120 provide day-by-day chronology.
- International Crisis Group. "Kenya After the Elections." Africa Report No. 141, February 2008. Available at https://www.crisisgroup.org/
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. "Kenya: Situation Reports, Dec 2007-Feb 2008." Available at https://www.unocha.org/