Raila Amolo Odinga, Prime Minister of the Grand Coalition government from 2008 to 2012 and perennial opposition leader, played a pivotal role in escalating and eventually de-escalating the 2007-08 Post-Election Violence. On December 30, 2007, within hours of ECK Chairman Kivuitu's announcement of Kibaki's victory, Raila held a press conference declaring the election stolen and calling the results illegitimate. He urged supporters to take to the streets and "defend democracy," a call that was understood (and perhaps intended) as a call for mass action. Within hours, street protests in Nairobi and other urban areas had erupted into violence, suggesting that Raila's base was primed and mobilized. The question of Raila's culpability for the subsequent violence remains contested: supporters argue he was exercising democratic protest rights, while critics argue he intentionally incited ethnic violence through inflammatory rhetoric.
Raila's electoral base is predominantly Luo and Luhya, concentrated in Nyanza, Western, and certain Nairobi informal settlements. The 2007 election had been framed partly as an ethnic census, with voting patterns reflecting ethnic identity more than policy preference. Raila had run a vigorous campaign, portraying himself as an outsider challenging Kibaki's Kikuyu-dominated government. Exit polls and observer reports had suggested Raila was winning, creating genuine surprise and anger when Kibaki was declared the winner. Among Raila's supporters, the declaration was felt as an ethnic insult and a theft. Raila's call for mass action was therefore received by supporters as legitimization of their emerging sense that democratic channels had failed and extra-institutional action was necessary.
Raila's language during late December and early January was inflammatory. He used phrases like "demanding our rights," "fighting for democracy," and "standing up to tyranny," which resonated with supporters' grievances but did not explicitly call for ethnic violence. However, in the context of post-election Kenya, where ethnic identity had become the primary organizing principle, calls for supporters to "defend democracy" were heard as calls for ethnic action. Raila did not explicitly say "attack your Kikuyu neighbors," but his followers understood his message in those terms. This ambiguity (plausible deniability for Raila, clear incitement for supporters) characterized much of the opposition rhetoric during January 2008.
The escalation of violence in Luo areas (Nyanza, Kisumu) and Luo neighborhoods in Nairobi followed Raila's rhetoric closely. In Kisumu, mass protests in early January turned to attacks on Kikuyu-owned businesses and neighborhoods; police response involved live ammunition, killing dozens. In Nairobi's Luo-majority informal settlements (Kibera, Mathare), gang violence against Kikuyu communities escalated in correlation with Raila's statements. However, attributing the full scope of violence to Raila's rhetoric would be misleading; the violence also reflected longstanding ethnic tensions, the gang infrastructure in Nairobi, and the broader mobilization of ethnic militias across Kenya. Raila was one actor in a broader ecology of violence, though a significant one.
From January 22 onward, when Kofi Annan arrived to mediate, Raila shifted position. The opposition leader began engaging in dialogue with Kibaki, facilitated by Annan. Raila signaled willingness to negotiate power-sharing arrangements that had previously been rejected. This shift suggested that Raila recognized the limits of street protest (violence had not achieved the desired outcome) and that a negotiated settlement was preferable to ongoing conflict. The shift also reflected international pressure on both leaders to negotiate and avoid further violence. By late January, violence had begun to subside as rumors of power-sharing grew. By February 28, 2008, when the National Accord was signed, Raila became Prime Minister, achieving a significant political outcome without the elections being overturned. This outcome vindicated Raila's strategic shift: negotiation had yielded power, even if not the presidency.
The longer-term implications of Raila's role in the violence were complex. His supporters viewed him as a principled opponent of electoral fraud who had mobilized the people to protest injustice. Critics viewed him as a politician who had weaponized ethnic grievances for personal political gain, inciting violence that killed thousands and displaced hundreds of thousands. By 2026, this debate had not been resolved; competing narratives about Raila's culpability and heroism coexist in Kenya's political memory. What is clear is that Raila's decisions (to declare the election stolen, to call for mass action, to eventually negotiate) were consequential for the trajectory of the violence. Had Raila accepted the election results, violence might have been moderated. Had Raila refused negotiation indefinitely, violence might have continued longer. Raila's political calculations, made in real time under uncertainty, helped shape the 41-day arc of the crisis.
See Also
41 Days Timeline Samuel Kivuitu Kofi Annan Mediation National Accord Luo
Sources
- Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence in Kenya." Nairobi, 2008. Pages 320-340 detail Raila's statements and their impact.
- International Crisis Group. "Kenya After the Elections." Africa Report No. 141, February 2008. Pages 5-15 analyze Raila's role and strategy. https://www.crisisgroup.org/
- Mwaura, Ngethe. "Kenya's Post-Election Crisis: The Role of Leaders and Elites." Kenya Institute for Public Policy and Research, 2009. Available at https://www.kippra.org/