Kofi Annan, former Secretary-General of the United Nations (1997-2006), arrived in Nairobi on January 22, 2008, to mediate the escalating Post-Election Violence crisis. Annan led an African Union Panel including Benjamin Mkapa (former president of Tanzania) and Graca Machel (Mozambique first lady and conflict resolution expert). The Panel's mandate was to facilitate dialogue between President Kibaki and opposition leader Raila Odinga and to produce a framework for resolving the electoral dispute and ending the violence. The mediation lasted 37 days (January 22-February 28), culminating in the signing of the National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement. While Annan's mediation did not solve the underlying conflicts or achieve accountability for the violence, it did halt the killing and produce a power-sharing arrangement that prevented the conflict from escalating further.
Annan's appointment was the result of international pressure on Kenya. Within days of December 30, 2007, the African Union, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, and Western governments had signaled concern about the violence and urged dialogue. However, initial Kenyan efforts at mediation (by civil society, church leaders, Kenyan government mediators) had failed; both Kibaki and Raila were entrenched in their positions. Kibaki insisted the election was final and could not be reopened; Raila insisted the election was stolen and Kibaki had no legitimacy. An international mediator of Annan's stature was seen as necessary to shift these positions. Annan had extensive experience in African conflict resolution and enjoyed credibility across the region, making him an acceptable choice to both sides.
The mediation process involved multiple parallel tracks. The African Union Panel met with Kibaki and Raila separately, then together, to understand their positions and look for common ground. Annan also met with business leaders, civil society representatives, and international actors to understand the scope of the crisis and the prerequisites for agreement. The Panel identified several core issues: (1) the legitimacy of the election and Kibaki's presidency, (2) the mechanism for resolving the dispute (recount, annulment, acceptance), (3) power-sharing arrangements if the dispute remained unresolved, (4) security and accountability for violence. Annan focused on (3) and (4), recognizing that resolving (1) and (2) would require both sides to concede fundamental positions, which neither was willing to do.
The power-sharing solution was creative and unprecedented in Kenyan history. Rather than determining a winner and loser, the mediation produced a compromise: Kibaki would remain president, but a new Prime Minister position (which had been abolished in 1964) would be created and filled by Raila. Cabinet positions would be divided between the two camps roughly proportional to their electoral strength. This arrangement allowed both sides to claim some victory: Kibaki retained the presidency, while Raila achieved executive power and the prospect of leading government business through the Prime Minister's office. The Grand Coalition government would be tasked with implementing constitutional reform and transitioning to a new electoral and governance structure. This solution was politically creative but constitutionally awkward; creating a Prime Minister position and sharing executive power between president and PM challenged existing constitutional frameworks.
Annan's negotiations were facilitated by escalating international pressure. The US, EU, and other Western governments had signaled that aid to Kenya would be suspended if the violence continued and a settlement was not reached. The threat of economic isolation, combined with the exhaustion of violence for both sides (neither could achieve military victory), moved the parties toward compromise. By late February 2008, both Kibaki and Raila recognized that some form of power-sharing was the likely outcome. The disagreement shifted from whether to share power to how much power each side would hold and what safeguards each would receive.
The mediation process also highlighted the limits of international intervention. Annan could facilitate dialogue and propose solutions, but he could not compel compliance or address the underlying ethnic tensions that had fueled the violence. The National Accord created a government of national unity, but it did not resolve the electoral dispute, did not hold perpetrators of violence accountable, and did not address structural causes of the conflict (land grievances, ethnic marginalization, winner-takes-all politics). By 2010, when the accord was being superseded by constitutional reform, it was clear that the 2008 agreement had been a temporary measure, not a permanent solution.
See Also
National Accord International Pressure 41 Days Timeline Kibaki Swearing-In Raila Odinga Response
Sources
- Annan, Kofi. "Interventions: A Life in War and Peace." New York: Penguin Press, 2012. Chapter on Kenya and the 2008 mediation mission.
- Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence in Kenya." Nairobi, 2008. Pages 430-460 detail the mediation process and outcome.
- International Crisis Group. "Kenya: No More Political Crises." Africa Report No. 232, May 2016. Includes analysis of the 2008 mediation and subsequent constitutional reforms. https://www.crisisgroup.org/