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Kibaki and Devolution

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Devolution, the system of 47 county governments created by the 2010 Constitution, was not Kibaki's idea. He resisted it, delayed it, and only accepted it as part of the political settlement forced on him after the 2007-08 violence. For Kibaki, devolution represented a loss of executive power, a constraint on presidential authority, and a concession to demands from marginalized regions and ethnic communities that had long complained of neglect by the Nairobi-centered state. But devolution became the most transformative institutional change of his presidency, reshaping Kenya's political and fiscal landscape in ways that are still unfolding.

The demand for devolution had deep historical roots. Kenya's independence constitution in 1963 had included a federal system, but Jomo Kenyatta dismantled it almost immediately, centralizing power in the presidency. For decades, regions outside Central Province and Nairobi complained that resources and development were concentrated in areas favored by the president. The Coast, North Eastern, Western, and parts of the Rift Valley saw themselves as peripheral, their resources extracted and their populations ignored. Devolution was meant to reverse this centralization.

The 2005 constitutional referendum, which Kibaki lost, had included a weak version of devolution. Raila Odinga and the Orange Democratic Movement had demanded more radical decentralization. After the Kofi Annan mediation brokered the National Accord, constitutional reform became a priority. The Committee of Experts, tasked with drafting a new constitution, proposed a system of 47 counties, each with an elected governor, county assembly, and fiscal allocation from the national government. At least 15% of national revenue would be devolved to counties, later increased to a minimum of 35% by subsequent judicial rulings.

Kibaki's response was ambivalent. He did not campaign against the 2010 constitution, but he did not enthusiastically champion devolution either. His silence spoke volumes. The Kikuyu elite around him, accustomed to accessing state resources through central government networks, saw devolution as a threat. Why share power and money with counties when the presidency controlled everything? But politically, Kibaki could not afford to oppose devolution openly. It was too popular, particularly in regions that had suffered most under centralization.

The constitutional referendum in August 2010 passed decisively, 67% to 33%. Devolution was coming. Kibaki's government then had the task of implementing it, a process that revealed his administration's ambivalence. Implementation was slow. The legal and institutional frameworks for devolution were delayed. The first county elections were scheduled for 2013, meaning Kibaki would leave office just as the new system began. He would not have to manage the transition; that would be Uhuru Kenyatta's problem.

Kibaki's legacy on devolution is contradictory. He did not champion it, but he did not sabotage it. He signed the constitution that created it. He allowed the legal and administrative groundwork to proceed, even if slowly. But he also ensured that devolution would be someone else's challenge. His final years in office, 2010 to 2013, were marked by a gradual winding down, a caretaker mode as the country prepared for the new constitutional order.

Devolution has since become the most durable aspect of the 2010 Constitution. County governments, for all their flaws, have brought governance closer to people. Infrastructure projects, health facilities, and local development are now partly determined at the county level, not solely in Nairobi. Counties have become sites of political competition, patronage, and occasionally innovation. Governors wield significant power, sometimes rivaling MPs. The system is imperfect, riddled with corruption and inefficiency, but it has fundamentally altered Kenya's political economy.

Kibaki likely understood that devolution would diminish the presidency he had occupied for a decade. He accepted it because the political cost of resistance was too high. The violence had made clear that centralized, winner-take-all politics was unsustainable. Devolution was the structural reform meant to address that. Kibaki, ever the pragmatist, signed it and moved on.

See Also

Sources

  1. D'Arcy, Michelle, and Marina Nistotskaya. "State First, Then Democracy: Using Cadastral Records to Explain Governmental Performance in Public Goods Provision." Governance 30, no. 2 (2017). https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/governance
  2. "Devolution in Kenya: The First Two Years," Institute of Economic Affairs Kenya, 2015. https://www.ieakenya.or.ke
  3. Republic of Kenya. Constitution of Kenya, 2010. http://www.kenyalaw.org/
  4. Cheeseman, Nic, Gabrielle Lynch, and Justin Willis. "Decentralisation in Kenya: The Governance of Governors." Journal of Modern African Studies 54, no. 1 (2016). https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/journal-of-modern-african-studies

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