Our Kenya

Grand Coalition Government

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The Grand Coalition Government, formed in April 2008, was Kenya's emergency political settlement. It paired Mwai Kibaki as president with Raila Odinga as prime minister, a newly created position, splitting executive power between rivals whose supporters had killed each other weeks earlier. The coalition was not chosen. It was imposed by international mediation, domestic exhaustion, and the threat of state collapse. It was bloated, dysfunctional, and riven by mistrust. But it worked well enough to stop the killing, pass a new constitution, and reach the 2013 elections without another explosion. The coalition was a failure of democracy and a success of crisis management.

The National Accord, signed on February 28, 2008, created the framework. Kibaki would remain president, retaining control over security forces, foreign policy, and the civil service. Raila would become prime minister, a position that did not exist under the old constitution but which the Accord created through constitutional amendment. Cabinet positions would be split proportionally between Kibaki's Party of National Unity and Raila's Orange Democratic Movement, based on their parliamentary strength. The deal was not power-sharing in the sense of genuine partnership. It was power-splitting, a division of spoils designed to prevent further violence.

The cabinet was massive, the largest in Kenya's history. With over 40 ministers and dozens of assistant ministers, it was designed to accommodate the patronage demands of both sides. Every faction needed to be bought in. Ministries were duplicated: two ministers for finance, two for agriculture, overlapping portfolios across the board. The government was inefficient by design. But inefficiency was the price of peace.

The relationship between Kibaki and Raila was poisonous. They had been allies in 2002, split over the broken MOU, and become enemies by 2007. The violence had deepened the rift. Kibaki believed he had won the election legitimately and resented being forced to share power. Raila believed Kibaki had stolen the presidency and saw the coalition as a temporary arrangement until the next election. They governed together out of necessity, not trust. Cabinet meetings were tense. Decisions were negotiated, not made. Policy paralysis was common.

Despite the dysfunction, the coalition achieved significant outcomes. The most important was the 2010 Constitution. Both sides, recognizing that the old constitutional order was unsustainable, supported the constitutional reform process. The referendum in August 2010 passed decisively, creating devolved county governments, constraining executive power, and reforming the judiciary. The constitution was the coalition's singular achievement, a structural reform that outlasted the government that produced it.

The coalition also maintained macroeconomic stability. The post-election violence had damaged the economy, but the formation of the Grand Coalition restored confidence. Investment resumed. Tourism recovered. GDP growth returned to respectable levels. The economic recovery of the first term, though slowed, continued. Ministers from both sides had incentives to maintain stability; economic collapse would hurt everyone.

Corruption, however, flourished. With two power centers and no clear accountability, looting accelerated. The Anglo Leasing pattern repeated itself in new scandals. Ministries became fiefdoms, with ministers treating public resources as personal property. The coalition's size and fragmentation made oversight nearly impossible. Civil society and the media documented the theft, but prosecutions were rare. Both sides protected their own.

The coalition also managed the transition to the new constitutional order. The first elections under the 2010 Constitution were held in March 2013. Kibaki, having served two terms, did not contest. Uhuru Kenyatta and William Ruto, both facing ICC indictments, formed the Jubilee Alliance and won. Raila lost, but he accepted the result after a legal challenge. The transition was peaceful, a stark contrast to 2007. The coalition had bought time and created the institutional framework for a less violent politics.

The Grand Coalition was never meant to be a model. It was a crisis response, a way to stop the killing and prevent state collapse. It proved that Kenyan elites could share power when forced to, but it also showed they would not do so voluntarily. The 2010 Constitution was designed to avoid future need for such arrangements by creating checks and balances that made winner-take-all politics harder to sustain. Whether it succeeded is still being tested.

See Also

Sources

  1. Kanyinga, Karuti, and Duncan Okello, eds. Tensions and Reversals in Democratic Transitions: The Kenya 2007 General Elections. Society for International Development, 2010.
  2. "The Grand Coalition: Kenya's Unity Government," International Crisis Group, 2009. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya
  3. Cheeseman, Nic. "The Kenyan Elections of 2007: An Introduction." Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, no. 2 (2008). https://www.tandfonline.com/journals/rjea20
  4. Branch, Daniel. Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963-2011. Yale University Press, 2011.

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