The 2013 election was the first nationwide electoral contest held under the 2010 Constitution, fundamentally reshaping Kenya's political, administrative, and electoral architecture. This constitutional framework, ratified by referendum in December 2010 and operationalized through legislation and institutional development over the subsequent three years, introduced a devolved two-tier government system, reformed the executive and legislative branches, and embedded new principles of accountability and representativeness that reverberated through the 2013 campaign and results.
The 2010 Constitution replaced the executive presidency with a hybrid system wherein the President, while retaining executive functions, operated within significantly constrained parameters. The President could no longer dissolve parliament unilaterally, faced term limits (two five-year terms), and operated under a bill of rights that expanded justiciability and individual recourse to courts. These changes reflected post-2007 violence reconciliation commitments and international pressure to entrench democratic safeguards. For the 2013 election, this meant candidates could not promise unlimited executive discretion, and the judiciary, reformed under the new framework, possessed authority to nullify electoral results if constitutional violations occurred.
Devolution introduced 47 county governments as coordinate centers of power alongside the national government, directly elected for the first time in 2013. This devolution framework was unprecedented in Kenya's history, fragmenting what had been a highly centralized state and creating new incentive structures for politicians. Rather than competing solely for national office (where winner-take-all dynamics had traditionally driven ethnic voting), ambitious politicians now pursued county gubernatorial positions, creating a parallel electoral economy. Counties held significant budgetary allocations and service delivery responsibilities, making gubernatorial contests competitive and consequential even for candidates not contending the presidency.
The constitution also mandated a running mate system, requiring presidential candidates to announce running mates before elections. This was a departure from previous practice, where running mates were selected post-election or remained ceremonial. The new requirement reflected constitutional architecture that split executive and legislative functions and intended running mates to be functional presidential deputies rather than symbolic afterthoughts. For 2013, this meant coalition dynamics involved negotiations not just between presidential aspirants but between presidential and vice-presidential candidates, complicating partner selection and creating potential for intra-coalition tension.
Electoral mechanics also changed substantively. The IEBC replaced the discredited Electoral Commission of Kenya, operating under a new constitutional mandate and reformed governance structure. The election required a candidate to secure not just a plurality of votes but 50% plus one to avoid a runoff, a threshold designed to encourage broad-based coalitions and consensus-building. This 50% threshold proved decisive in 2013: Uhuru Kenyatta's 50.07% margin, while razor-thin, avoided triggering a runoff that might have reshuffled coalition arithmetic.
Representation requirements embedded in the constitution also shaped 2013 outcomes. A constitutional gender quota required that no more than two-thirds of elected office holders be of the same gender, incentivizing nomination of women candidates for parliamentary and gubernatorial positions. The 2013 election saw increased female representation, particularly in parliamentary races, though the gender quota's full impact required several election cycles to mature fully.
The constitutional framework also reformulated the National Assembly, replacing the bicameral structure with a unicameral 290-seat chamber plus 47 senator positions representing counties, alongside separate gubernatorial contests. This structural change fragmented legislative politics and complicated coalition-building, as parties needed to field candidates across multiple competitive arenas simultaneously.
See Also
2013 Election 2013 Election Devolution Debut 2013 Election Running Mates 2013 Election IEBC 2013 Election Women 2013 Election Technology
Sources
- Constitutional Commission of Kenya. (2010). The Constitution of Kenya 2010. Retrieved from https://www.ck.org/
- International Foundation for Electoral Systems. (2013). Kenya 2013 Elections: Constitutional Implementation Report. Retrieved from https://www.ifes.org/
- Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. (2013). Review of the 2013 Elections. Retrieved from https://www.knchr.org/