The 2013 election represented the first large-scale deployment of electronic and biometric technologies in Kenyan electoral administration, marking a significant technological leap from the 2007 election, which had relied on paper-based manual counting and tabulation. The IEBC introduced biometric voter registration (capturing photographs and fingerprints), electronic result transmission systems (using SMS and proprietary software), and computerized voter roll management, with the intention of enhancing electoral security, reducing fraud opportunities, and accelerating results aggregation and announcement.
The biometric voter registration system was deployed during the voter registration period preceding the election. The IEBC aimed to create a comprehensive, tamper-resistant voter roll by capturing biometric data (photographs and fingerprints) alongside traditional demographic information (names, voter identity numbers, polling locations). The system operated through mobile registration centers deployed across the country, using specialized equipment to capture and store biometric data. The theoretical advantages of biometric registration were substantial: it would prevent double registration, deter impersonation, and create an auditable record of voter eligibility tied to specific individuals.
In practice, the biometric system experienced significant implementation challenges. Registration equipment malfunctioned or required frequent recalibration, slowing the registration process and creating bottlenecks in certain regions. Reports of deceased voters, duplicate registrations, and missing data points indicated that the biometric system, while technologically sophisticated, had not eliminated fundamental electoral administration vulnerabilities. Some regions experienced voter roll inflation, where the number of registered voters exceeded plausible population figures. These problems suggested that technological solutions, while potentially valuable, required sophisticated implementation capacity and institutional discipline that Kenya's electoral institutions had not yet fully developed.
The electronic result transmission system deployed by the IEBC involved returning officers at polling stations electronically transmitting results from polling stations to county tallying centers and ultimately to the national tallying center in Nairobi. The system used a combination of SMS transmission and proprietary software developed specifically for the election. The intended advantages were significant: electronic transmission would reduce the time window for result manipulation, accelerate the tabulation process, and create a digital audit trail that could be compared against hardcopy results for verification purposes.
The electronic transmission system also experienced implementation challenges. Telecommunications infrastructure in rural areas was insufficient to reliably support electronic transmission, forcing some polling stations to rely on hardcopy result forms transported physically to tallying centers. This created the asymmetry that Raila's Supreme Court petition highlighted: some results were electronically transmitted and thus subject to potential digital manipulation, while others existed only in physical form. The IEBC's failure to establish a consistent protocol across all polling stations meant that result verification procedures were incomplete, creating space for allegations of fraud and manipulation.
Additionally, the electronic transmission system was vulnerable to cybersecurity risks that Kenya's IT security capacity was not adequately positioned to manage. Allegations emerged during the election that unauthorized individuals had accessed the IEBC's electronic systems, though these allegations were never definitively substantiated. The vulnerability of the electronic systems meant that the IEBC's credibility depended substantially on the public's confidence that its IT infrastructure was secure, a confidence that was not universal and that subsequent elections would further test.
The technological deployments did achieve some success. The computerized voter roll, despite its problems, represented an improvement over previous paper-based systems. The biometric data captured, while imperfectly implemented, created potential for future refinement and auditing. The electronic result transmission, despite transmission failures and vulnerabilities, did allow the IEBC to announce results substantially faster than in 2007, when the tabulation process consumed several weeks and provided extended opportunities for result manipulation. The 2013 election's results were announced within days, suggesting that the electronic systems had achieved their intended acceleration effects.
Critically, the deployment of technology in 2013 revealed that technological sophistication was not a substitute for institutional capacity and political will. The IEBC possessed sophisticated equipment but lacked the organizational maturity, IT security capacity, and institutional discipline to implement the technology consistently and securely. This lesson would persist through subsequent elections, wherein Kenya continued to pursue technological solutions while struggling with the institutional foundations necessary to deploy them effectively.
See Also
2013 Election 2013 Election IEBC 2013 Election Results 2013 Election Supreme Court Petition 2013 Election New Constitution Context
Sources
- International Foundation for Electoral Systems. (2013). Technology and Electoral Administration in Kenya: Implementation Report. Retrieved from https://www.ifes.org/
- Finlay, Andrew. (2013). Technology in Kenyan Elections: Promise and Peril. African Studies Review, 56(2), 78-95.
- Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission. (2013). Biometric Voter Registration and Electronic Transmission: Technical Assessment. Retrieved from https://www.iebc.or.ke/