Nairobi's pre-existing criminal gangs became the infrastructure for organized ethnic violence in the city's informal settlements during the 2007-08 Post-Election Violence. Two groups were primary: Taliban, a Luo-dominated gang operating in Kibera and Mathare, and Mungiki, a Kikuyu-affiliated group operating citywide with particular strength in Kibera and central Nairobi. Before December 30, 2007, these gangs engaged in turf wars, protection rackets, and street-level violence but without explicit ethnic framing. The post-election crisis provided an opportunity to rebrand criminal violence as ethnic and political action, giving gang members both ideological justification for violence and external funding from political figures seeking militia proxies.
Taliban and Mungiki had existed as recognized gang structures for years before 2007. Taliban, named after the Afghan militia group that had recently (2001) been in the news, emerged in the early 2000s as a criminal organization controlling parts of Kibera. The gang's members were predominantly Luo youths aged 15-30, many unemployed or underemployed in the informal economy. The gang's revenue came from street robbery, protection fees, and organized theft. Taliban members maintained neighborhood territorial control and enforced internal discipline through violence. Similarly, Mungiki operated as an elaborate criminal organization with religious and cultural ideology, but also generating revenue through extortion and controlled trafficking of various goods.
The transition from criminal gang to ethnic militia was remarkably rapid. Within days of the election dispute, both Taliban and Mungiki leaders made decisions to join the post-election violence explicitly. Taliban framed itself as the defender of Luo interests against Kikuyu aggression. Mungiki positioned itself as the protector of Kikuyu communities. Both groups mobilized their members using ethnic rhetoric, though the underlying organizational structure remained that of a criminal gang. Taliban members used their neighborhood knowledge and territorial control to conduct Luo ethnic attacks on Kikuyu populations. Mungiki did the same in reverse.
The organizational advantage of using gangs as militias was significant. Unlike rural militia groups that needed to be mobilized from scratch, urban gangs already had: (1) established hierarchical command structures, (2) experienced members trained in violence, (3) territorial control and neighborhood intelligence, (4) weapons caches, and (5) communication networks. A politician wanting to organize violence in Nairobi could contract with a gang leader, provide financial support, and rely on the gang to deliver violence in specific neighborhoods. Evidence presented to the ICC suggested that Uhuru Kenyatta's office made payments to Mungiki; similarly, politicians linked to the Luo community allegedly made payments to Taliban. These financial transfers allowed gang leaders to increase member compensation, expand operations, and conduct large-scale coordinated violence.
The violence perpetrated by Nairobi gangs was devastating for affected communities. In Kibera, the Taliban-Mungiki warfare created a combat zone where residents could not venture out safely. Human Rights Watch documented at least 30-40 instances where Mungiki and police (separately) killed civilians in Kibera with no legal consequence. In Mathare, gang violence similarly created zones where residents feared movement. Survivors reported rape, robbery, and summary execution as routine during the violence period. The gangs also looted extensively; shops were burned and robbed, homes were entered and property taken. The economic devastation of Kibera and Mathare was severe; many shopkeepers fled, market activity ceased, and residents relocated.
Police responses to gang violence in Nairobi were themselves violent and indiscriminate. Rather than investigating gang crimes, police largely responded by conducting punitive raids on gang-dominated neighborhoods, resulting in extrajudicial killings. These killings often targeted young Luo men in areas where Taliban was active, or young Kikuyu men in Mungiki-dominated areas. Police killings totaled perhaps 100-150 in Kibera and Mathare combined during the 41 days. The police violence was not distinguished from gang violence by residents; both were sources of terror. By some accounts, police killings exceeded gang killings, making state violence a larger killer in Nairobi's informal settlements than militia violence.
Post-violence, Nairobi gangs gradually demobilized or transitioned to other criminal activities. Taliban and Mungiki continued to exist as criminal organizations through the 2010s-2020s, but the explicit ethnic framing of their violence declined. By the 2010s, gang warfare in Nairobi appeared driven more by competition for drug distribution and informal taxation than by ethnic politics, though ethnic dimensions persisted. The 2007-08 violence had been a unique moment when criminal organizations and political actors aligned, with gangs serving as militia for ethnic conflict. By 2026, while gang violence in Nairobi remained high, it was less clearly connected to electoral politics or ethnic mobilization than it had been in 2007-08.
See Also
Kibera Mathare Mungiki Politicians and Militias Impunity
Sources
- Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence in Kenya." Nairobi, 2008. Pages 140-180 on urban gang violence and mobilization.
- Human Rights Watch. "Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya's Crisis of Governance." New York, March 2008. Pages 88-130 on Nairobi gang violence and police abuse. https://www.hrw.org/
- Amnesty International. "Kenya: Torture and Ill-Treatment by State Security Forces." London, 2009. Pages 20-50 on police gang response in Kibera and Mathare. https://www.amnesty.org/