The International Criminal Court's investigation and prosecution strategy was built on the theory of a "network of principals": the argument that senior politicians (President Kibaki, Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta, Vice President Kalonzo Musyoka, Minister for Disaster Management Samuel Kamau, Minister of Finance Henry Kosgey, Police Commissioner Mohammed Hussein Ali, and others) organized, funded, and directed militia violence through intermediaries. The ICC's framework understood the violence not as spontaneous ethnic clashes but as coordinated campaigns of persecution and ethnic cleansing orchestrated by high-level political actors who bore criminal responsibility for crimes against humanity. This network-of-principals approach required evidence showing that politicians made strategic decisions, provided financial resources, and issued directives that resulted in violence by militia groups.
The evidence for political-militia coordination came from multiple sources. KNCHR investigations documented patterns of violence that appeared coordinated across geographic areas and over time, suggesting central direction rather than spontaneous outbreak. Witness testimony from militia members and others involved in the violence described meetings with politicians, receipt of money, and explicit directives to conduct violence in specific locations. Bank records and financial traces allegedly showed money flowing from government accounts to militia intermediaries. Cellphone records suggested contact between politicians and militia coordinators. The International Criminal Court compiled this evidence into a narrative of deliberate planning and execution of ethnic cleansing.
The mechanism of coordination allegedly involved multiple tiers. At the top, senior politicians made strategic decisions about whether to pursue violence or negotiation. These decisions flowed to mid-level operatives (local administrators, security force officers, political party officials) who translated political direction into operational planning. At the ground level, militia group leaders received direction from both the mid-level operatives and direct contact with politicians or their representatives. Militia foot soldiers received compensation (cash, promises of land, protection) in exchange for conducting violence. This hierarchical structure, if it existed as alleged, would have resembled a military command system, with orders flowing downward and accountability flowing upward.
The evidence for this structure, however, proved difficult to sustain in court. The ICC prosecution pursued cases against William Ruto and Joshua Sang (a journalist) and separately against Uhuru Kenyatta, but both cases faced difficulties. Witnesses who had described meetings with politicians and payments recanted their testimony, often claiming they had been coerced or bribed to make false accusations. The prosecution attributed witness recantation to intimidation, but proving intimidation was difficult. By 2014-2016, when the trials were concluding, the prosecutor had lost the narrative of the network of principals. The cases were abandoned or lost at the trial chamber level.
Domestically, Kenya did not create parallel investigations into the political-militia nexus. The government's main accountability mechanism, the Waki Commission, had investigated violence and produced findings, but these were not translated into prosecutions. The Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission (2008-2013) also investigated political involvement in the violence but focused on processes of truth-telling rather than prosecution. Both commissions produced findings that implicated politicians in organizing violence, but there was no political will to prosecute these findings. By 2013, when the prosecution of political figures became possible (after the ICC cases collapsed), the political landscape had shifted. Uhuru Kenyatta was elected president in 2013, making him untouchable politically. William Ruto became Deputy President in 2013, similarly insulated from prosecution. Other alleged architects of the violence held political office or had influential networks that protected them.
The question of whether the network-of-principals narrative accurately reflects reality remains contested. Critics of the ICC argue that the prosecutor imposed an overly hierarchical and centralized understanding of violence that actually emerged from decentralized, self-organized ethnic mobilization. They suggest that the focus on elite culpability downplayed the agency and grievances of ordinary people who participated in violence. Supporters of the ICC argue that investigation and evidence showed clear patterns of elite coordination and that elites cannot evade responsibility simply by using intermediaries. The truth likely involves both elements: elite actors did provide strategic direction and financial support, but violence also involved autonomous action by militia groups and community members responding to real and perceived grievances.
By 2026, no Kenyan political figure had been convicted of organizing the violence. The question of whether Kenya's political elites ordered, funded, and directed the 2007-08 violence remained historically contested but legally unresolved. This failure of accountability meant that the cost of organizing violence (in terms of personal legal jeopardy) was zero, and the political benefits were potentially substantial. This immunity contributed to the argument by some observers that Kenya's political elite had not learned the lessons of 2007-08 and that the risk of renewed violence in subsequent election periods (2013, 2017, 2022) remained elevated.
See Also
Waki Commission ICC Uhuru Case ICC Ruto Case Mungiki Kalenjin Warriors
Sources
- International Criminal Court. "Prosecutor v. William Samoei Ruto and Joshua Arap Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11." Court filings and trial chamber decision available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/
- Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence in Kenya." Nairobi, 2008. Pages 320-425 detail evidence of political involvement in organizing violence.
- Human Rights Watch. "Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya's Crisis of Governance." New York, March 2008. Pages 35-100 on political coordination of violence. https://www.hrw.org/