Mathare, Nairobi's second-largest informal settlement in the city's northeast, experienced violence patterns similar to Kibera but with higher police lethality. The settlement, home to approximately 500,000 people with significant Luo, Kikuyu, and Somali populations, became a key arena of gang warfare between Taliban (Luo-affiliated) and Mungiki (Kikuyu-affiliated) starting December 30, 2007. Within the first week, at least 50 people had been killed. Police responded with raids that produced an estimated 100-150 extrajudicial killings by February 2008, making Mathare proportionally more deadly from state violence than informal settlements elsewhere. The violence of gangs and police together claimed the lives of approximately 200-250 people from Mathare, along with displacing at least 80,000 residents.
Mathare's geography enabled organized gang violence. The settlement is built along the Mathare River in a narrow valley, creating natural defensive positions and limited police access. Neighborhoods are densely packed and divided by informal boundaries that gang members understood and exploited. Taliban controlled northern sections (Mathare North, Mlango Kubwa), while Mungiki held southern territories (Mathare South, Gitare). The river itself became a dumping ground for bodies; by late January 2008, international media reported that the river "ran red" with decomposing remains. This image, along with photographs from Kiambaa, defined global perception of the violence's severity. Bodies in the river were not always identified; KNCHR estimated that hundreds of people from Mathare were killed but never counted in official statistics because they were dumped rather than formally registered as deaths.
Police strategies in Mathare were particularly brutal. Raids were conducted without warrants or legal process, targeting neighborhoods on the basis of ethnic composition. Officers from the paramilitary General Service Unit (GSU) and Criminal Investigation Department (CID) conducted sweeps, ostensibly targeting gang members but often killing residents at random. Survivors described scenes of police cordoning neighborhoods, then executing young men lined up. An Amnesty International investigation documented at least 47 specific cases in Mathare with witness testimony and photographic evidence of bodies. In a few cases, police killings were investigated by the KNCHR, but no convictions resulted. Officers responsible remained in service through 2008 and beyond, with some promoted to senior ranks. The message was clear: police violence carried no consequences.
The social composition of Mathare made it vulnerable to ethnic stratification. Unlike Kibera, which has deep historical roots as an informal settlement, Mathare developed in the 1970s-1990s as a destination for rural-to-urban migrants seeking informal employment (construction, street vending, sex work). Its population was more fluid and less rooted in place. When violence erupted, residents found it easier to flee entirely rather than defend neighborhoods or advocate for their return. By March 2008, the settlement was largely emptied, with temporary shelters established in industrial areas on Nairobi's periphery (Kahawa Sukari, Kajiado). Many residents, particularly Somali merchants who had been targeted sporadically, did not return; the Somali commercial presence in Mathare did not recover, and by the 2010s, the settlement had become predominantly Luo and Kikuyu.
Sexual violence in Mathare was documented at scale. KNCHR recorded at least 120 rape cases in Mathare during the 41 days, making it a secondary hotspot after the Rift Valley. Perpetrators included gang members and police. Gang rape was used to terrorize ethnic minorities; women from the majority group in a neighborhood were often raped by gangs from rival territories as a form of ethnic domination. Police also perpetrated sexual violence, often targeting Somali women and sex workers, groups with minimal recourse to justice. Pregnancies resulted from rape, and some women gave birth to children they could not acknowledge due to stigma. Formal prosecution of sexual violence remained minimal; out of an estimated 1,200-1,500 rapes across Kenya during the PEV, fewer than 20 cases reached trial, and convictions were even rarer.
Recovery in Mathare remained slow and incomplete. By 2010, most IDPs had returned, but the settlement remained economically depressed and insecure. Gang violence continued through the 2010s-2020s, though the ethnic framing shifted. By the 2020s, gang violence in Mathare appeared driven more by competition for drug distribution and informal taxation than explicit ethnic politics, though ethnic dimensions persisted. The Mathare River remained dangerous; bodies continued to be dumped there during gang flare-ups through 2015. By 2026, the government had made no serious investment in Mathare's infrastructure or services, reflecting its status as an informal settlement. Environmental health remained dire; the river, once a source of water during colonial times, remained a dumping ground for refuse and bodies. The trauma of 2007-08 had become embedded in Mathare's identity; older residents spoke of the violence as a defining rupture, while younger residents born after knew the settlement only as fractured and insecure.
See Also
Kibera Nairobi Gangs Police Violence Sexual Violence Impunity
Sources
- Amnesty International. "Kenya: Torture and Ill-Treatment by State Security Forces." London, 2009. Pages 34-48 on Mathare extrajudicial killings. https://www.amnesty.org/
- Kenya National Commission on Human Rights. "Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Post-Election Violence in Kenya." Nairobi, 2008. Pages 160-180 on urban violence documentation.
- Human Rights Watch. "Ballots to Bullets: Organized Political Violence and Kenya's Crisis of Governance." New York, March 2008. Pages 100-130 on Mathare and informal settlement violence. https://www.hrw.org/