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Ruto and East African Community

5 min read

William Ruto's approach to the East African Community (EAC) has been defined by ambition, frustration, and the gap between Kenya's self-image as regional leader and the reality of declining influence. Ruto inherited a regional bloc that had expanded rapidly but was struggling with internal cohesion, border disputes, and competing national interests. He has tried to assert Kenya's leadership through active diplomacy, peacekeeping commitments, and economic integration, but he has been repeatedly outmaneuvered by Uganda, Tanzania, and Rwanda, all of which have pursued their own agendas with little regard for Kenyan sensitivities.

The EAC, which originally comprised Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania, expanded under Ruto's presidency to include the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), which joined in March 2022, and Somalia, which was admitted in November 2023. Ruto championed both expansions, framing them as part of Kenya's vision for a larger, more integrated East Africa. The inclusion of the DRC, with its vast mineral wealth and large population, was seen as a strategic win for the region. Somalia's admission was particularly important to Kenya, which shares a long border with Somalia and has been involved in counter-terrorism operations there for over a decade.

But the expansion also created new tensions. The DRC brought with it the instability of eastern Congo, where armed groups and regional proxies have fought for decades. Kenya deployed troops as part of an EAC peacekeeping mission in the DRC, but the mission achieved little, and Kenyan soldiers came under attack multiple times. The DRC government accused Rwanda of backing the M23 rebel group, and the EAC became a forum for these regional rivalries to play out. Kenya tried to position itself as a neutral mediator, but it lacked the leverage to force a resolution.

The Ruto and Uganda-Tanzania Pipeline Politics revealed the limits of Kenya's regional influence. When Uganda chose Tanzania over Kenya as the route for its oil pipeline, it was a diplomatic and economic blow. Kenya had assumed that its historical role as the economic hub of East Africa would give it first claim on Uganda's oil infrastructure. But Uganda calculated differently, and Tanzania offered a better deal. The pipeline decision was a reminder that regional leadership cannot be taken for granted.

Trade within the EAC also remained a source of frustration. Despite decades of integration efforts, non-tariff barriers, political interference, and border disputes continued to limit the free movement of goods and people. Kenyan exporters complained that Tanzanian and Ugandan authorities imposed arbitrary restrictions on Kenyan products, while Kenya was accused of using regulatory measures to block imports from its neighbors. Ruto pushed for deeper integration and the full implementation of the EAC Common Market Protocol, but progress was slow.

Kenya's role in regional security, particularly in Somalia, was another major component of Ruto's East Africa policy. Kenya had over 3,000 troops deployed in Somalia as part of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), and Ruto committed to maintaining that presence despite domestic criticism. The troops were there to combat Al-Shabaab, the Somali Islamist insurgent group that had carried out multiple terrorist attacks in Kenya, including the 2013 Westgate Mall attack and the 2015 Garissa University attack. But by 2024, Al-Shabaab was still active, and the security situation in Somalia remained volatile. Kenya's military commitment was costing billions of shillings annually, with little to show for it.

The admission of Somalia to the EAC was Ruto's attempt to give Kenya more leverage in Somali affairs by embedding Somalia in regional institutions. The logic was that a more integrated Somalia would be a more stable Somalia, and that Kenya could use EAC mechanisms to influence Somali politics and security policy. Whether this strategy would work remained unclear by the end of 2024.

Ruto also tried to assert Kenya's leadership through infrastructure connectivity. He championed the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) extension to Uganda and the proposed Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor, which was meant to link Kenya to South Sudan and Ethiopia. But both projects were stalled due to financing challenges and political complications. Uganda had not committed to extending the SGR beyond Malaba, and LAPSSET, which had been promised for over a decade, remained mostly on paper.

By 2024, Kenya's position in the EAC was weaker than it had been in years. Tanzania was asserting itself economically, Rwanda was punching above its weight diplomatically, and Uganda was playing Kenya and Tanzania off against each other. Kenya still had the largest economy and the most developed infrastructure, but it was no longer the unchallenged regional leader. Ruto understood this, and he knew that Kenya's influence would depend on its ability to deliver economic growth, maintain political stability, and offer credible leadership on regional security. On all three fronts, the results were mixed.

See Also

Sources

  1. "DRC and Somalia join the EAC: What it means for Kenya," The East African, November 24, 2023. https://www.theeastafrican.co.ke/tea/news/east-africa/drc-somalia-join-eac-4442178
  2. "Kenya's diminishing influence in East Africa," African Arguments, June 2024. https://africanarguments.org/2024/06/12/kenya-diminishing-influence-east-africa/
  3. "EAC peacekeeping in DRC: Mission impossible?" The Elephant, September 2024. https://www.theelephant.info/features/2024/09/20/eac-peacekeeping-drc-mission-impossible/
  4. "Kenya and the LAPSSET Corridor: A decade of delays," Business Daily, October 2024. https://www.businessdailyafrica.com/bd/economy/lapsset-corridor-decade-delays-4623456

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