Devolution was the most consequential constitutional reform Uhuru Kenyatta inherited from the 2010 constitution, fundamentally restructuring Kenya's governance by creating 47 county governments with significant autonomy and resources. The system transferred functions (health, agriculture, water, early childhood education) and at least 15 percent of national revenue to counties, aiming to bring government closer to people, reduce marginalization of peripheral regions, and dilute the winner-take-all nature of presidential elections. Devolution's implementation under Uhuru was messy, corrupt, and transformative: it created new centers of power, delivered genuine service improvements in many counties, but also enabled massive corruption and ethnic patronage at the local level.
The 2010 constitution's devolution provisions emerged from the 2007 Post-Election Violence, driven by recognition that Kenya's hyper-centralized presidency created existential zero-sum elections. Devolution promised that communities could benefit from government even if their ethnic group lost the presidency. The first county elections in March 2013, concurrent with Uhuru's presidential victory, created 47 governors, 47 county assemblies, and over 1,800 elected county representatives. The new county governments assumed office in March-April 2013 with massive expectations, limited capacity, and unclear division of responsibilities with the national government.
Winners under devolution included peripheral counties like Turkana, Isiolo, and Marsabit, which had been systematically marginalized under centralized rule. These counties received significant budget allocations (at least 15 percent of national revenue distributed by population and other factors) far exceeding what they had received historically. Devolution enabled investment in county roads, water projects, health facilities, and economic development. Governors in these counties became powerful patrons, controlling resources and jobs. For residents, devolution meant that government was no longer something that happened in Nairobi to them but something they could access and influence locally.
Losers included the national government, which resisted transferring functions and funds, and citizens in counties governed by corrupt or incompetent governors. The political economy of county governments quickly replicated the national government's corruption, with procurement fraud, ghost workers, and county officials living lavishly while services deteriorated. Some governors used county resources to build ethnic patronage machines, rewarding their sub-clans while marginalizing minorities within counties. Inter-county inequality also emerged: well-governed counties (like Makueni under Kivutha Kibwana) delivered impressive results, while poorly governed ones squandered resources with little accountability.
The relationship between Uhuru's national government and county governments was characterized by tension and power struggles. The national government consistently delayed disbursing county allocations, creating cash flow crises. Governors, organized through the Council of Governors, lobbied for increased allocations, demanding the constitutional minimum be raised from 15 percent to 35 percent or even 45 percent. Uhuru's government resisted, arguing that counties lacked absorption capacity and that increasing county allocations would bankrupt the national government. The BBI constitutional amendment attempt included provisions to increase county funding to 35 percent, which Uhuru supported as part of the handshake deal with Raila Odinga.
Corruption in counties became endemic and spectacular. The Auditor General's annual reports documented billions in questionable expenditure: county officials buying luxury vehicles, foreign travel for "benchmarking," ghost workers, and procurement fraud rivaling national-level scandals. Few governors faced successful prosecution despite credible evidence of theft. The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) arrested several governors, but most returned to office pending trial, and convictions were rare. The pattern mirrored national-level impunity, suggesting that devolution had decentralized corruption along with power, creating 47 new sites of elite extraction rather than transforming governance.
Despite corruption and dysfunction, devolution delivered tangible benefits that made it politically irreversible by the end of Uhuru's presidency. Citizens could access government services locally without traveling to Nairobi. County health facilities improved in many areas. Roads were built. Economic opportunities emerged. Politically, devolution created 47 new power centers that could not be abolished without constitutional amendment requiring a referendum, which would likely fail given devolution's popularity. The system's survival through Uhuru's decade, despite its flaws, demonstrated that Kenyans preferred imperfect local governance to perfect centralization.
See Also
- County Governments First Term
- 2007 Post-Election Violence
- 2013 Presidential Election
- Uhuru and Corruption
- Building Bridges Initiative
- Kikuyu Political Power
- Luo Political History
- State Capture
Sources
- "Devolution in Kenya: Five Years On," Institute of Economic Affairs Kenya, 2018. https://www.ieakenya.or.ke/publications/devolution-kenya-five-years
- "Kenya's Devolution: The Governance Revolution," World Bank, 2016. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/publication/kenyas-devolution
- "Auditor General's Reports on County Governments 2013-2022," Office of the Auditor General Kenya. https://www.oagkenya.go.ke/reports/county-governments
- "The Political Economy of Kenyan Counties," African Economic History Network Working Paper, 2019. https://www.aehnetwork.org/working-papers/political-economy-kenyan-counties/