The first term of Kenya's 47 county governments (2013-2017) was a chaotic, improvisational experiment in decentralized governance that fundamentally reshaped Kenyan politics. The inaugural governors elected in March 2013, concurrent with Uhuru Kenyatta's presidential victory, took office with enormous expectations, minimal institutional capacity, unclear mandates, and sudden access to billions of shillings. The learning curve was steep, mistakes were abundant, corruption was rampant, yet genuine service delivery improvements occurred in well-governed counties. The first term established devolution as politically irreversible while revealing deep challenges in accountability, capacity, and elite capture.
The 47 inaugural governors were a diverse group: former MPs, business people, provincial administrators, and political outsiders. Some, like Peter Munya in Meru and Isaac Ruto in Bomet, brought significant political experience. Others, like Kivutha Kibwana in Makueni, came from civil society and academic backgrounds. A few, like Anne Waiguru in Kirinyaga (elected in 2017 after serving as Cabinet Secretary during the NYS Scandal), were deeply connected to national politics. The governors' varied backgrounds meant that county government quality varied wildly: some counties were governed professionally, others became personal fiefdoms, and many fell somewhere between.
The learning curve involved basic governance challenges that national government officials took for granted. County governments had to establish institutions from scratch: hire staff, create procurement systems, develop budgets, and establish relationships with national government agencies whose functions they were assuming. The handover of health facilities from the national government to counties in 2013 was particularly chaotic, with disputes over staff transfers, equipment ownership, and budget allocations. Hospitals ran out of essential supplies, doctors went unpaid, and services deteriorated in many counties during the transition. The teething problems were real and often affected the most vulnerable citizens.
Corruption in the first term was spectacular and largely unpunished. County governments became sites of massive procurement fraud, with patterns mirroring national scandals. Counties bought luxury vehicles for governors and county assembly members, spent millions on "benchmarking" trips abroad, created ghost workers, and awarded inflated contracts to politically connected suppliers. The Auditor General's reports for 2013-2017 documented billions in questionable expenditure across counties. However, prosecution was rare. The Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission (EACC) arrested several governors, including Ferdinand Waititu (Kiambu), Mike Sonko (Nairobi), and Okoth Obado (Migori), but convictions remained elusive due to judicial delays and political protection.
Despite dysfunction and corruption, genuine service delivery improvements occurred in well-governed counties. Makueni under Kivutha Kibwana became the model, implementing free maternal healthcare, building water projects, constructing markets, and maintaining transparent procurement. Kakamega under Wycliffe Oparanya invested in health facilities and agriculture. Uasin Gishu under Jackson Mandago improved county roads and education infrastructure. These success stories demonstrated devolution's potential: when governors were competent and reasonably honest, county governments could deliver services that had been impossible under centralized rule.
The relationship between governors and county assemblies was characterized by conflict and collusion. County assemblies, Kenya's newest democratic institutions, were supposed to provide oversight. In practice, many assemblies were corrupted through allowances, foreign travel, and kickbacks from procurement. Governors who kept county assembly members (MCAs) happy through resource sharing faced minimal scrutiny. Governors who alienated their assemblies faced impeachment attempts, which were often politically motivated rather than accountability-driven. By 2017, several governors had been impeached (though most had their removals overturned by the Senate or courts), establishing impeachment as a weapon in county power struggles rather than an accountability mechanism.
The political impact of the first term was to create new power centers independent of the presidency. Governors became significant political actors, controlling patronage networks and resources that made them indispensable to presidential coalitions. William Ruto's strength in the Rift Valley during his fallout with Uhuru was partly due to his alliance with several Rift Valley governors. Raila Odinga's support base in Nyanza and coastal counties was reinforced by governors aligned with him. The 2017 elections saw 22 of 47 governors re-elected, indicating that voters distinguished between national and county politics and that some governors had delivered enough to earn second terms.
See Also
- Uhuru and Devolution
- 2013 Presidential Election
- Uhuru and Corruption
- State Capture
- 2007 Post-Election Violence
- 2017 Presidential Election
- Kikuyu Political Power
- Luo Political History
Sources
- "Kenya's First Generation of County Governments: An Assessment," Institute of Economic Affairs Kenya, 2017. https://www.ieakenya.or.ke/publications/first-generation-county-governments
- "Devolution in Kenya: The First Five Years," Society for International Development, 2018. https://sidint.net/content/devolution-kenya-first-five-years
- "Corruption in Kenya's County Governments," Transparency International Kenya, 2017. https://tikenya.org/corruption-county-governments-report/
- "County Governance in Kenya: Performance and Challenges 2013-2017," World Bank Kenya, 2018. https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/kenya/publication/county-governance-performance-challenges