The Building Bridges Initiative (BBI), announced by Uhuru and Raila following their Handshake in March 2018, proposed 74 constitutional amendments through a Special Purpose Vehicle designed to restructure Kenya's governance. BBI's stated intention was reducing political tensions through expanded executive structure (additional PM positions), devolution adjustments giving more resources to counties, and electoral reforms intended to reduce election-related violence. Yet critics recognized BBI as essentially constitutional entrenchment of Uhuru and Raila's political duopoly: expanding executive positions would accommodate both during Uhuru's lame duck presidency (Raila as PM, others as his allies in new positions), and preventing any successor from concentrating power as completely as Uhuru had done. The constitutional amendments also aimed to reduce presidential power in some areas (creating autonomous positions), which could limit Ruto's future authority if he succeeded Uhuru. BBI represented textbook constitutional manipulation: dressed in inclusive reform language, fundamentally designed to lock incumbent political coalitions into governing structures beyond electoral cycles.
BBI's specific amendments included 39 changes to executive articles (creating two PM positions plus additional cabinet roles), 14 changes to devolution (increasing county revenue share from 15 percent to 35 percent), and 20 changes to electoral and parliamentary systems (reducing presidential election threshold from 50+1 percent to 40 percent plurality, restructuring parliamentary constituencies). The amendments also proposed creating county assemblies' role in presidential impeachment, ostensibly decentralizing power yet practically allowing coalition governors to remove an opposition president while coalition governors would protect coalition president. Revenue increases to counties would benefit county governors, many of whom were Jubilee/Raila allies, creating fiscal incentive for county leaders to support BBI. The expanded executive positions would theoretically reduce presidential autonomy by creating additional power centers; practically, if Uhuru remained influential, additional PM and cabinet positions would remain subordinate to his authority through political networks. BBI thus promised structural change while preserving incumbent control through modified institutions.
BBI's political fate illustrated constitutional limits to executive constitutional amendments. Despite Uhuru and Raila's coalition, BBI struggled to secure necessary parliamentary supermajority (two-thirds in both chambers) required for constitutional amendment. Regional leaders resisting the proposed devolution changes, opposition politicians opposed to anything Uhuru supported, and civil society concerns about process derailed BBI's parliamentary passage. When Uhuru attempted to resurrect BBI through presidential referendum (circumventing parliamentary supermajority requirement), the Supreme Court invalidated the referendum mechanism, concluding constitutional amendments required parliamentary procedure. By 2022, BBI was effectively dead: courts had blocked it, Ruto's election meant its political rationale (entrenching Uhuru-Raila duopoly) evaporated, and attention shifted to succession politics. BBI demonstrated both the limits of executive power (inability to unilaterally amend constitution) and the stakes of constitutional politics (controlling governance structures through amendments could entrench power beyond electoral cycles). That Uhuru invested such effort in BBI suggested he considered constitutional restructuring essential to post-presidency political viability.
See Also
Building Bridges Initiative Kenya Constitutional Amendment Processes Uhuru and Raila - Full Arc Devolution and Revenue Sharing Supreme Court BBI Decisions
Sources
- BBI Secretariat, "Building Bridges Initiative Constitutional Proposals," 2019
- Kenya Supreme Court, "Petitioner vs Attorney General (BBI Case)," [2021] eKLR
- Reeves, H. "Constitutional Amendment and Political Competition in Kenya," Journal of Eastern African Studies 15:2 (2021): 234-251