Security during Uhuru Kenyatta's presidency was defined by Kenya's ongoing confrontation with Al-Shabaab, the Somalia-based terrorist group that conducted devastating attacks on Kenyan soil. Three major attacks marked Uhuru's tenure: Westgate Mall in September 2013 (67 killed), Garissa University in April 2015 (148 killed), and DusitD2 hotel complex in January 2019 (21 killed). These attacks, along with dozens of smaller incidents particularly in northeastern Kenya, revealed both the persistent threat Al-Shabaab posed and the Kenyan security establishment's recurring failures in intelligence, response, and prevention.
Kenya's Al-Shabaab problem was a direct consequence of Operation Linda Nchi, the 2011 military intervention into Somalia that Uhuru inherited from Mwai Kibaki. Kenya Defense Forces (KDF) entered Somalia in October 2011 to create a buffer zone and eliminate Al-Shabaab, which had conducted kidnappings in northern Kenya. By 2012, KDF had integrated into the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), becoming part of a regional effort to support Somalia's federal government against the insurgency. However, Kenya's military presence in Somalia made it a prime Al-Shabaab target for retaliation.
Al-Shabaab's stated rationale for attacking Kenya was explicit: to punish Kenya for its military occupation of parts of Somalia and to pressure the Kenyan government to withdraw KDF. The group's propaganda framed the conflict as jihad against Kenyan "crusaders" and presented attacks on Kenyan civilians as legitimate retaliation for KDF operations in Somalia. This framing resonated with some radicalized Kenyan Muslims, particularly in coastal regions and northeastern Kenya, where Al-Shabaab recruited fighters and logistical supporters from marginalized Somali and Muslim communities who felt alienated from the Kenyan state.
The pattern of major attacks revealed serious intelligence and response failures. In each case (Westgate, Garissa, DusitD2), there were advance warnings that security agencies failed to act on. At Westgate, warnings about a potential mall attack circulated weeks before the assault, but no preventive measures were taken. At Garissa University, intelligence indicated a planned attack on an educational institution in the region, yet campus security remained minimal. At DusitD2, attackers moved weapons and explosives into Nairobi despite supposed heightened security. The recurring intelligence failures suggested systemic problems in Kenya's security architecture: poor inter-agency coordination, corruption enabling terrorists to bypass checkpoints, and political interference preventing effective security operations.
Response to attacks was also consistently problematic. At Westgate, it took security forces four days to end the siege, with reports of looting by KDF soldiers and friendly fire casualties. At Garissa, response time was hours despite the university being in a known high-risk zone. At DusitD2, despite improvements from previous attacks, coordination between police, military, and special forces remained chaotic. Each attack was followed by promises of reform, better training, improved intelligence sharing, and enhanced security, yet the next attack revealed similar failures. The pattern suggested that Kenya's security establishment was either incapable of learning from mistakes or that structural issues (corruption, ethnic favoritism in recruitment, political interference) prevented effective reform.
Uhuru's response to Al-Shabaab threats oscillated between military action and securitization of Somali and Muslim communities. He maintained KDF's presence in Somalia despite the costs and casualties, arguing that withdrawal would allow Al-Shabaab to establish bases closer to Kenya's border. He increased defense spending, purchased new military equipment, and built a border wall with Somalia. However, his government also conducted mass arrests of Somali and Muslim Kenyans after attacks, collective punishment that violated constitutional rights and likely increased radicalization. The 2014 Kasarani stadium detention of thousands of Somalis after Westgate, and similar operations in northeastern Kenya, damaged Muslim-state relations and fed Al-Shabaab's recruitment narrative.
The hard choices Uhuru faced had no easy answers. Withdrawing from Somalia might reduce Al-Shabaab's motivation to attack Kenya but could allow the group to regroup and threaten Kenya from across the border. Staying in Somalia imposed costs (over 500 KDF soldiers killed by 2022, billions in military spending) and made Kenya a target but might prevent a worse security situation. Aggressive counter-terrorism operations risked alienating Somali and Muslim communities, but softer approaches might leave terrorists unchecked. By the end of Uhuru's presidency, Al-Shabaab remained a serious threat, Kenya still had forces in Somalia, and no clear victory was in sight, only an expensive stalemate.
See Also
- Westgate Attack 2013
- Garissa University Attack 2015
- Kenya's Somalia Intervention
- 2007 Post-Election Violence
- Uhuru and Raila - Full Arc
- Security Sector
- 2013 Presidential Election
- Uhuru Legacy Assessment
Sources
- "Kenya and the War on Al-Shabaab," International Crisis Group, September 2014. https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/horn-africa/kenya/kenya-and-war-al-shabaab
- "Al-Shabaab's Threat to Kenya," Council on Foreign Relations Backgrounder, January 2020. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/al-shababs-threat-kenya
- "Kenya's Approach to Counter-Terrorism Since Westgate," Institute for Security Studies, 2018. https://issafrica.org/research/papers/kenyas-approach-to-counter-terrorism-since-westgate
- "The Cost of Kenya's Military Intervention in Somalia," African Arguments, October 2021. https://africanarguments.org/2021/10/cost-kenya-military-intervention-somalia/