The 2017 election witnessed unprecedented campaign engagement through social media platforms and simultaneous proliferation of digital misinformation and propaganda operations that dwarfed the 2013 social media campaign environment. By 2017, Facebook, Twitter, WhatsApp, and Instagram had achieved substantial penetration in Kenya, particularly among younger and urban demographics, creating new campaign channels through which candidates could reach voters and through which partisan supporters could mobilize. However, the expanded social media environment also created platforms through which disinformation could spread rapidly and through which coordinated propaganda campaigns could operate with limited accountability.
Both the Jubilee and opposition NASA coalitions deployed sophisticated digital campaign strategies. Campaign teams managed social media accounts, posted campaign content, and engaged in online debate with opposition supporters. The campaigns utilized social media to share campaign rally announcements, candidate videos, policy position statements, and attacks on opposition candidates. The speed and reach of social media platforms allowed campaigns to amplify messaging and respond rapidly to breaking news or opposition statements.
The 2017 election saw substantial proliferation of automated social media accounts (bots) and coordinated inauthentic behavior aimed at amplifying partisan messaging and at creating false impressions of public opinion. Both coalitions apparently deployed bot networks and coordinated accounts that would repost and amplify coalition messaging. These coordinated online operations meant that social media timelines presented artificially skewed pictures of public opinion, with bot networks and paid account coordinators creating the appearance of grassroots enthusiasm for their preferred candidates.
Misinformation and false information circulated extensively through social media platforms, with both coalitions and their supporters deploying false or misleading content intended to undermine opponent credibility. False claims about candidates' health, background, financial status, and campaign activities circulated widely through WhatsApp, Facebook, and Twitter. The 2017 election witnessed substantially more coordinated disinformation campaigns than the 2013 election, suggesting escalating sophistication of digital propaganda operations in Kenya.
Ethnic propaganda and divisive content circulated through social media, with content aimed at mobilizing ethnic constituencies through appeals to ethnic identity and through dehumanizing or stigmatizing rival ethnic groups. Some social media content explicitly invoked violence or physical harm against members of competing ethnic groups, creating concerns that social media could contribute to ethnic violence. The spread of violent or dehumanizing ethnic content through platforms like WhatsApp and Facebook represented a departure from traditional media environments wherein ethnic propaganda faced editorial constraints.
Platform responses to disinformation and false content were limited. Facebook and Twitter had minimal content moderation capacity in Kenya and provided limited fact-checking or corrective labeling of false information. WhatsApp, in particular, operated without content moderation mechanisms, creating a platform particularly vulnerable to spread of unfiltered misinformation. The platforms' limited moderation capacity meant that false information could circulate extensively before being addressed or corrected.
A fact-checking ecosystem had begun emerging in Kenya by 2017, with organizations like Africog and the Kenya Fact-Check Initiative attempting to identify and counter misinformation. However, these fact-checking organizations had limited reach compared to the misinformation they sought to counter, and the speed of social media spread meant that false information could propagate before fact-checks could address it.
The 2017 election also witnessed digital activism and grassroots mobilization through social media. Opposition supporters utilized platforms like Twitter to organize demonstrations and to publicize accounts of electoral irregularities and security force violence. Civil society organizations used social media to document and report on the election and to mobilize around democracy and human rights concerns. The bidirectional character of social media meant that it served simultaneously as a platform for propaganda and as a vehicle for grassroots activism.
The Supreme Court nullification decision and the subsequent political crisis generated extensive social media engagement, with supporters of both camps utilizing platforms to debate the decision's merits and to mobilize responses to the electoral outcome. The nullification decision's significance meant that it triggered sustained digital discourse and debate regarding judicial authority and electoral legitimacy.
By 2017, digital literacy and awareness of misinformation remained limited among some segments of the Kenyan population, particularly among older and less educated demographics. This vulnerability to misinformation created openings for propaganda campaigns to affect voting behavior through false or misleading content consumed on social media platforms. The 2017 election thus demonstrated the ways in which digital platforms could amplify both legitimate campaign messaging and misinformation with equal technical ease.
See Also
2017 Election 2017 Election August 8 Vote 2017 Election Jubilee Campaign 2017 Election NASA Coalition 2017 Election Violence
Sources
- Internews. (2017). Kenya 2017: Disinformation and Social Media Analysis. Retrieved from https://internews.org/
- BBC Media Action. (2017). Kenya Election 2017: Social Media and Digital Campaign Report. Retrieved from https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/
- Otieno, Justus. (2017). Digital Propaganda and Electoral Politics in Kenya's 2017 Election. Journal of East African Studies, 11(4), 589-608.