Following the Supreme Court's August 30, 2017, nullification of the August 8 presidential election results, opposition leader Raila Odinga announced that the NASA (National Super Alliance) coalition would boycott the October 26 re-run election unless the IEBC implemented comprehensive institutional reforms addressing the electoral administration violations that the Supreme Court had identified. The boycott represented a dramatic political decision that transformed what had been a competitive electoral contest into a one-candidate walkover and reflected Raila's assessment that participating in an election administered by a discredited institution would be politically counterproductive.
Raila's boycott logic rested on several premises. First, the opposition argued that the IEBC had demonstrated fundamental institutional incapacity and that the 60-day period between the nullification order and the October 26 re-run was insufficient time for the commission to undertake the comprehensive reforms that would be necessary to address identified vulnerabilities. Second, the opposition suggested that participating in the re-run without securing IEBC reform would implicitly validate the commission's continuation in office and would accept continued compromise of electoral administration. Third, the boycott was intended to pressure the government and IEBC to address opposition concerns and to signal that the opposition would not merely accept the Supreme Court's procedural nullification while continuing to participate in a flawed process.
The boycott strategy was controversial even within the opposition coalition. Some NASA partners, particularly Kalonzo Musyoka and Moses Wetangula, expressed reservations about the boycott, preferring to participate in the October re-run despite institutional concerns. The boycott's implementation thus required Raila to consolidate coalition support around the boycott strategy, a consolidation that was not universal and that created internal coalition tensions.
The boycott announcement triggered immediate political reactions. The Jubilee government characterized the boycott as undemocratic and argued that the opposition was simply unable to accept electoral defeat. Jubilee suggested that the opposition was manufacturing institutional concerns as pretexts for refusing to accept an election outcome that favored the incumbent. This framing positioned the opposition as opponents of democracy itself, rather than as actors concerned with institutional credibility.
International observers were divided regarding the boycott. Some international actors viewed the boycott as a legitimate response to electoral administration concerns, suggesting that opposition participation in a flawed process might be more harmful to democratic development than strategic non-participation. Other international actors expressed concern that opposition boycott set problematic precedents and that electoral competition should proceed even in contexts of institutional imperfection. These divergent international reactions reflected different conceptualizations of what democratic participation requires.
The boycott's political impact was substantial. Turnout in the October 26 election declined dramatically compared to the August 8 vote, with turnout falling from approximately 79% to approximately 40%. The geographic variation in turnout reflected boycott patterns, with opposition strongholds exhibiting sharply reduced participation while Jubilee-aligned regions maintained higher turnout levels. This turnout variation created a geographic distortion wherein the October election results reflected predominantly the votes of Jubilee-supporting regions and lacked the cross-regional representation that the August vote had achieved.
Raila's boycott strategy had several short-term and long-term political implications. In the short term, the boycott meant that the incumbent Kenyatta achieved overwhelming October victory margins that appeared more decisive than the August 54% result. However, this apparent decisiveness was hollow, as it reflected opposition absence rather than increased support. In the longer term, the boycott created political space for the handshake negotiation through which Raila and Uhuru would eventually reconcile, suggesting that the boycott's strategic logic included preparing ground for eventual political realignment.
The boycott also affected parliamentary and other electoral contests. Since the elections across multiple electoral tiers were conducted simultaneously, the boycott's impact was not limited to the presidential race but extended to parliamentary, senatorial, and gubernatorial contests. The reduced opposition mobilization in boycott regions meant that opposition party parliamentary candidates faced reduced voter turnout and mobilization, potentially affecting down-ballot races.
Post-election analysis suggested that the boycott had been a calculated political gamble that created conditions for subsequent political realignment. Rather than representing simple electoral defeat that the opposition sought to avoid through boycott, the boycott reflected a sophisticated political calculation that the October rerun, even in the context of opposition absence, could not provide the incumbent with the legitimate mandate necessary for unconstrained governance. The boycott thus prepared space for subsequent negotiations between Raila and Uhuru that would ultimately produce the political reconciliation through the handshake.
See Also
2017 Election 2017 Election October Re-run 2017 Election Supreme Court Nullification 2017 Election NASA Coalition 2017 Election Handshake Prelude
Sources
- Raila Odinga. (2017). Statement on NASA Coalition Boycott of October Re-run Election. Retrieved from https://www.odinga.or.ke/
- International Crisis Group. (2017). Kenya's Political Crisis: Boycott and Reconciliation. Retrieved from https://www.crisisgroup.org/
- Wanyande, Peter. (2017). Opposition Boycotts and Electoral Politics in Kenya. Kenya Institute for Public Policy Research and Analysis.