Daniel arap Moi's plan to hand-pick his successor and ensure continued KANU rule after his constitutionally-mandated retirement represented a critical failure in Kenya's democratic transition. Moi's selection of Uhuru Kenyatta as his preferred successor reflected both the logic of insider politics (choosing someone presumed to be amenable to guidance) and the assumption that KANU's control of state machinery would ensure electoral victory. However, the succession plan's collapse revealed the limits of institutional patronage and state control when confronted with organized opposition and changed political contexts. The failure of Moi's succession strategy stands as a central narrative of 2002: the end not only of Moi's rule but also of KANU's capacity to control Kenya's political future.
Moi's consideration of succession had begun gradually in the years before 2002, as constitutional term limits made clear that 1997 would be his last possible term. Moi had historically ruled by controlling succession within the state elite, ensuring that powerful figures were managed through patronage and the threat of exclusion from state resources. However, the question of presidential succession was different: the constitution required a genuine election, and the outcome could not be entirely controlled through the traditional tools of patronage. Moi's response was to attempt to manage the election by selecting a successor presumed to be controllable, while deploying the remaining resources of the state to ensure that successor's victory.
Uhuru's selection as Moi's hand-picked successor followed from several logic strands. First, Uhuru was young enough to appear as a fresh face while young enough to potentially remain in power for decades, thereby extending the political order that had benefited Moi's inner circle. Second, Uhuru was acceptable to both Kikuyu political interests (through family connections and business dealings) and to the Moi establishment itself. Third, Uhuru was presumed to lack the independent political base that might threaten Moi's continued influence; Uhuru would presumably remain amenable to guidance from the retiring president. Fourth, the Kenyatta family name (from Jomo Kenyatta's founding presidency) carried historical weight that might legitimize a Kenyatta return to the presidency.
The succession strategy assumed that KANU's control of state apparatus would be sufficient to ensure Uhuru's victory. The state's broadcasting monopoly, control over electoral administration, patronage networks, and security apparatus were deployed on Uhuru's behalf. However, by 2002, these structural advantages had eroded more than Moi may have anticipated. Independent media had expanded substantially since 1997. Opposition parties had learned coalition-building lessons. International context had shifted away from KANU and toward post-Moi transitions. The assumption that state control of electoral machinery could override changed political consciousness proved mistaken.
The succession plan's failure began before the election, as KANU politicians recognized Uhuru's weakness and the likelihood of opposition victory. The phenomenon of "crossing the floor," in which KANU MPs and officials switched their allegiances to NARC in the final weeks before the election, represented a dramatic repudiation of Moi's succession strategy. Ambitious politicians, recognizing that NARC would likely form the government, positioned themselves within the winning coalition. This defection from KANU demonstrated that Moi's patronage networks, while still potent, could not prevent politicians from pursuing their own advancement through opposition parties.
The electoral result vindicated politicians' calculations: KANU's collapse in the 2002 election suggested that those who had remained loyal to Moi's succession strategy had chosen poorly. Uhuru's 31 percent vote share and KANU's loss of parliamentary majority meant that the succession strategy had failed completely. Rather than smoothly transferring power to a Moi-approved successor, the 2002 election had resulted in power transferring to an opposition that, while not actively hostile to Moi's immediate interests, was not obligated to protect them.
The post-election period revealed further dimensions of the succession strategy's failure. Moi, having retired from the presidency with Kibaki's victory, faced a new relationship to power. As an elderly former president without access to state resources or patronage networks, Moi's influence over Kibaki and the new government was limited. Additionally, Moi faced potential accountability for corruption and human rights abuses from his era, as the Kibaki government initially signaled (though later largely abandoned) commitment to investigating past governance failures.
The succession strategy's failure also reflected the limits of machine politics in contexts where institutions have partially democratized. While Moi's control of broadcasting, electoral commission, and security forces remained substantial, these tools could not entirely override the effects of changed international context, expanded independent media, and organized opposition coalition-building. The gap between Moi's remaining institutional power and the political will to use it to suppress opposition proved consequential: Moi chose not to overtly rig the 2002 election through violence or transparent fraud (as he might have done), instead accepting defeat.
The collapse of Moi's succession strategy stands as a pivotal moment in Kenya's democratic transition. It marked the end not only of Moi's personal rule but also of KANU's capacity to control the nation's political future. It demonstrated that even an incumbent with substantial institutional advantages could be defeated when opposition unity, international support, and economic desperation aligned. The 2002 succession strategy's failure thus became a template for understanding how authoritarian succession attempts could be blocked through democratic means.
See Also
- 2002 Election
- Daniel arap Moi
- Uhuru Kenyatta
- KANU collapse
- 2002 Election Uhuru Kenyatta
- Kenya's democratic transition
Sources
- Throup, David (2002). "The Kenyan Election 2002: The Transition of Power." In Widner, Jennifer (Ed.), "The Scramble for Africa." Oxford University Press. https://www.doi.org
- Branch, Daniel (2011). "Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1992-2011." Yale University Press. https://www.yalebooks.com
- International IDEA (2003). "The 2002 General Elections in Kenya: Findings and Recommendations." https://www.idea.int/publications/catalogue/2002-general-elections-kenya
- Electoral Commission of Kenya (2003). "The 2002 General Elections in Kenya: Official Results." Nairobi: ECK. https://www.eck.or.ke/public-documents/election-results