North Eastern Kenya, comprising Somali-majority counties (Garissa, Wajir, Mandera), received disproportionate presidential attention during Uhuru presidency focused entirely on counterinsurgency against Al-Shabaab rather than development. Following the Westgate attack (2013), Garissa University attack (2015), and subsequent bombings, Uhuru's national security apparatus made North Eastern Kenya the epicenter of military operations, intelligence operations, and security sector resource allocation. Yet security investment occurred alongside severe development neglect: North Eastern remained Kenya's poorest region with 80+ percent poverty rates, minimal healthcare infrastructure, limited schools, and virtually no industrialization. Uhuru's governance logic treated North Eastern as security problem to be managed through military intervention rather than development opportunity to be invested. The bifurcation meant security presence was intense (military checkpoints, intelligence operations, aerial surveillance) while social services remained chronically underfunded. Somali-Kenyans experienced both militarization and neglect simultaneously.
The humanitarian cost of Uhuru's security-focused North Eastern policy was severe. Military operations included extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, and collective punishment of Somali communities accused of harboring terrorists. An Amnesty International report documented military abuses in Garissa and Wajir resulting in hundreds of deaths, torture, and widespread disappearances. Uhuru's government denied these allegations and refused independent investigations, protecting security sector from accountability. Simultaneously, health facilities in Garissa and Wajir deteriorated due to chronic underfunding, leading to preventable disease deaths exceeding conflict-related casualties. Schools in Mandera lacked electricity and running water for decades under Uhuru presidency. When development initiatives occurred, they typically involved national government taking over pastoral rangelands for national parks or conservation areas, further marginalizing pastoral communities' livelihoods. Uhuru's North Eastern policy thus represented security domination combined with economic subordination.
Uhuru's North Eastern governance exposed tensions between counterinsurgency effectiveness and human rights protection. Security operations did reduce large Al-Shabaab attack frequencies by 2019-2020 compared to 2013-2015 peaks, suggesting some operational success. Yet this success came through violence that traumatized civilian communities, generated grievances driving recruitment into extremist networks, and violated Uhuru's own constitutional commitments. By governing through security domination without corresponding development investment, Uhuru created conditions perpetuating instability: young people with no economic opportunity, communities traumatized by military abuse, and institutional collapse in health and education. When Ruto assumed presidency in 2022, his North Eastern policy initially continued similar security focus, though some shift toward economic development became visible by 2023-2024. The region's persistent underdevelopment was not inevitable but structural consequence of how Kikuyu and Rift Valley presidents prioritized their home regions over marginal northern territories.
See Also
North Eastern Kenya and Somali Community Al-Shabaab and Kenya Security Military Operations in Garissa and Wajir Westgate Attack 2013 Human Rights and Counterinsurgency in Kenya
Sources
- Amnesty International, "Military Abuses in Kenya's North Eastern Region," 2016
- Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, "North Eastern Region Inquiry Report," 2019
- International Crisis Group, "Al-Shabaab in East Africa: Dynamics and Responses," 2019