Kibaki's government established the Constituency Development Fund (CDF), a mechanism through which government revenues were allocated directly to elected Members of Parliament for distribution to development projects within their constituencies. The CDF represented an attempt to decentralise development planning and to empower elected representatives to direct resources to locally identified priorities. The mechanism allocated a fixed percentage of the national budget to constituencies on an equitable basis, with additional allocations to disadvantaged areas.
The CDF was formally established through legislation and represented a significant innovation in Kenya's development financing mechanisms. It reflected Kibaki's commitment to decentralisation and to allowing elected officials to have control over development resources. The CDF gave Members of Parliament considerable power over the allocation of funds within their constituencies, creating incentives for them to be responsive to their constituents' needs and to deliver visible development projects that would enhance their political standing.
However, the CDF also became a mechanism for corruption and the misallocation of resources. Members of Parliament, many of whom had interests in construction companies or other businesses that benefited from CDF projects, used the funds to award contracts to friendly firms, to enrich themselves, and to build political support through selective allocation of resources to supporters' areas. The CDF became notorious for funding of poor-quality projects, for cost inflation, and for the absence of meaningful needs assessment or cost-benefit analysis in project selection.
The CDF also had implications for the geography of development in Kenya. Wealthier constituencies where representatives had stronger connections and greater construction capacity tended to deliver more projects, while poorer constituencies sometimes saw minimal development activity. The fund also became a mechanism through which patronage was distributed, with politically important constituencies receiving disproportionate resources and opposition constituencies being marginalised.
Despite these problems, the CDF represented an attempt to involve elected representatives in development planning and to direct resources to the constituency level. The mechanism reflected Kibaki's belief in decentralisation and the empowerment of local communities. However, the actual practice of the CDF fell far short of these ideals, as elite capture, corruption, and political manipulation undermined the fund's potential to promote equitable development. The CDF would later be replaced under the 2010 constitutional framework with more structured systems of county government and devolution.
See Also
Decentralisation and Development Kenya Constituency Politics Kenya Public Finance Management Kenya Corruption in Development Projects Local Government Kenya Parliamentary Representation and Development
Sources
- Kameri-Mbote, Patricia. The Operational Environment and Constraints for Safeguarding the Environment in Kenya. IELRC Working Paper, 2007.
- Kenya Budget and Analysis Unit. Constituency Development Fund Tracking Report 2003-2013. Government Press, 2013.
- Transparency International. Corruption in Devolved Systems: East African Experience. TI Publications, 2013.