In 1959, after six years of detention at Lokitaung, Jomo Kenyatta was transferred to Lodwar, a town in Kenya's Turkana region. The transfer from Lokitaung to Lodwar represented a slight amelioration of conditions: Lodwar was somewhat less remote and had a larger civilian population than Lokitaung, though it remained a small and relatively isolated town. However, the legal status of Kenyatta's confinement changed: rather than being held as a detainee in an isolated facility, he was now subjected to restriction orders that confined him to the town of Lodwar and required him to report regularly to colonial authorities.

Restriction orders were a standard tool of colonial governance in Kenya during the emergency period. They allowed the authorities to confine an individual to a specific geographic location without formally imprisoning him. A restricted person could move about within the restricted area but could not travel beyond it. They were required to report to local authorities and could be further restricted or imprisoned if they violated the terms of their restriction. For Kenyatta, restriction at Lodwar meant that he remained in custody, but under somewhat less harsh conditions than at Lokitaung.

The move to Lodwar also reflected changing political circumstances. By 1959, the Mau Mau rebellion had been effectively suppressed, and the colonial government was beginning to contemplate the transition to African rule. Kenyatta's removal from Lokitaung to Lodwar may have been designed to ease international pressure regarding his detention while maintaining his removal from Kenya's political center. The colonial authorities were also preparing, however reluctantly, for a negotiated transition to independence, and keeping Kenyatta in detention became increasingly awkward diplomatically and politically.

At Lodwar, Kenyatta was able to maintain slightly more contact with the outside world than at Lokitaung. News from Nairobi and from Kenya's nationalist movement could reach him; visitors could more easily travel to Lodwar than to Lokitaung. Yet his restriction to the town meant that he remained isolated from the intensifying political negotiations that were occurring in Nairobi and in London. He could not attend meetings, could not address crowds, and could not directly participate in the constitutional negotiations that would determine Kenya's path to independence.

The restriction at Lodwar lasted from 1959 until 1961. During this period, the Lancaster House Conferences were held, constitutional frameworks for independence were negotiated, and elections were held that would determine Kenya's first independent government. Kenyatta's restriction meant that he did not directly participate in these processes, yet his presence, even in confinement, remained symbolically important. Negotiations conducted without Kenyatta's participation were understood to be incomplete, and various parties sought his cooperation or feared his opposition once he was released.

The gradual opening of Kenyatta's restriction reflected both political changes and international pressure. The British government faced criticism, particularly in the Commonwealth and in international forums, for maintaining the detention of a prominent nationalist leader. The achievement of independence in other colonies, and the British government's acceptance of African majority rule, made Kenyatta's continued confinement increasingly difficult to justify. Pressure from African leaders, from liberal opinion within Britain, and from international opinion generally contributed to the decision to eventually release Kenyatta.

See Also

Kenyatta detention at Lokitaung Kenyatta restriction at Maralal Kenyatta release April 1961 Lancaster House Conference 1960 and 1962 Kenyatta Detention Legacy

Sources

  1. Jeremy Murray-Brown, Kenyatta (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1972), pp. 245-275.
  2. David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain's Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (New York: W.W. Norton, 2005), pp. 115-145.
  3. Daniel Branch, "The Enemy Within: Loyalists and the War against Mau Mau," Journal of African History, vol. 48, no. 2 (2007), pp. 291-315.