Daniel arap Moi's relationship with Kenya's Asian community, primarily of South Asian descent (Gujaratis, Punjabis, Goans, and others who arrived during British colonial rule), was transactional, pragmatic, and mutually beneficial for the political and business elites involved, even as it reinforced patterns of ethnic economic stratification that persisted long after Moi left office. The Asian business class, historically dominant in commerce and manufacturing, navigated Moi's presidency by providing financial support to his regime, facilitating corrupt schemes like Goldenberg, and receiving in return access to government contracts, land, and protection from populist attacks. The relationship was not one of equals; Asians remained politically marginalized and vulnerable to scapegoating, but economically powerful and indispensable to Moi's patronage machine.
Kenya's Asian community, roughly 100,000 people by the 1980s, controlled disproportionate economic power. They dominated wholesale and retail trade, owned major manufacturing firms, and controlled significant real estate in Nairobi and Mombasa. This economic dominance had roots in colonial policies that restricted Africans from commercial sectors and created intermediary roles for Asians. After independence, Jomo Kenyatta maintained this economic structure while politically marginalizing Asians; they could do business but were excluded from political power and faced periodic threats of nationalization or forced Africanization.
Moi continued this pattern but with more explicit transactionalism. Wealthy Asian businessmen, including families like the Patels, Shahs, and Khamisis, became crucial financiers of KANU and Moi's political operations. They contributed to harambee fundraisers, provided cash for political campaigns, and financed Moi's personal patronage network. In return, they received government contracts, import licenses, and exemptions from regulations that constrained African competitors. The relationship was rarely formalized; it operated through personal networks, often mediated by key figures in Moi's inner circle like Nicholas Biwott.
The Goldenberg Scandal illustrated the deepest form of this relationship. Kamlesh Pattni, a young Kenyan-Asian businessman, orchestrated a fraud that cost Kenya over $600 million with the protection and participation of senior government officials. Pattni's ethnicity was significant; as an Asian, he operated in networks that African politicians trusted less and monitored less closely. The assumption was that Asians were apolitical, focused on business, and unlikely to challenge the regime. This stereotype provided cover for Pattni to operate at scales that might have drawn more scrutiny had he been African. When the scandal eventually broke, Pattni was scapegoated, but the African politicians who enabled and profited from Goldenberg faced less accountability.
Politically, Asians were second-class citizens with first-class economic privileges. They could not realistically aspire to high political office; no Asian held a cabinet position under Moi, and Asian representation in parliament was minimal. Citizenship itself was contested; many Asians held Kenyan citizenship after independence, but periodic campaigns to verify citizenship targeted the community, creating insecurity. Moi occasionally wielded this vulnerability as leverage; implicit threats about citizenship or business licenses ensured Asian compliance with regime demands.
The community's economic dominance also made it a convenient scapegoat during economic crises. When structural adjustment programs caused price increases or unemployment, populist politicians, including some within KANU, blamed "Asian exploitation" rather than government policy failures. Moi sometimes allowed this rhetoric to deflect criticism but prevented it from escalating into policy or violence that would disrupt the economic networks he depended on. The 1992 and 1997 election violence, which targeted up-country Africans in the Rift Valley and Coast, largely spared Asians, in part because their economic value to the regime made them untouchable.
Specific Asian businessmen became integral to Moi's economic policy. The Khan family controlled significant shipping and logistics operations at Mombasa port, making them critical to import-export trade. The Chandaria family's manufacturing conglomerate received government contracts and trade protections. These relationships were mutually beneficial: Asian businesses thrived under Moi's patronage, and Moi's regime extracted rents through informal taxes, commissions on contracts, and political contributions. The system was corrupt but functional, at least for the participants.
The Asian community's internal diversity often went unnoticed by African politicians. Gujarati Hindus, Punjabi Sikhs, Ismaili Muslims, and Goan Christians had distinct identities, languages, and economic niches, but were collectively categorized as "Asians" by the state and public. This flattening obscured class divisions within the community; wealthy industrialists like the Chandarias had little in common with small shopkeepers or service workers, yet all faced similar political vulnerabilities and stereotypes.
Culturally, the Asian community remained largely separate from African political and social life. Intermarriage was rare, residential segregation was common (Asians concentrated in neighborhoods like Parklands in Nairobi), and social networks were insular. This separation reinforced mutual suspicion: Africans viewed Asians as clannish and exploitative, Asians viewed African politics as corrupt and dangerous. Moi's regime benefited from this division; as long as Asians and Africans did not build cross-ethnic solidarity, potential challenges to his rule remained fragmented.
The end of Moi's presidency in 2002 did not fundamentally alter the Asian community's position. They remained economically dominant, politically marginalized, and dependent on transactional relationships with whoever held power. The NARC government under Mwai Kibaki, a Kikuyu, shifted some patronage networks back toward Kikuyu elites, but Asian businessmen adapted, cultivating relationships with the new administration. The pattern established under Moi, economic indispensability in exchange for political vulnerability, persisted.
Moi's legacy for the Asian community was the institutionalization of their economic role and political exclusion. He did not invent this system, but he perfected its exploitation, extracting maximum financial support from Asian businesses while offering only conditional protection. The community's survival strategy, keeping a low political profile, accumulating wealth, and building transnational networks that allowed exit if necessary, reflected a rational response to a system where they were always guests, never fully citizens, despite generations of residence in Kenya. The relationship was not partnership but extraction, dressed up as mutual benefit, a microcosm of how Moi's regime functioned more broadly: rewarding those useful to his rule while ensuring they remained dependent and vulnerable.
See Also
- Goldenberg Scandal
- Moi and Harambee
- Moi Era Corruption
- Structural Adjustment Programs Kenya
- 1992 Election and Ethnic Violence
- Ethnic Economic Stratification
- Kikuyu-Asian Business Networks
- Citizenship and Political Belonging
Sources
- Maxon, Robert M., and Thomas P. Ofcansky. Historical Dictionary of Kenya. Scarecrow Press, 2014. https://rowman.com/ISBN/9780810879782/Historical-Dictionary-of-Kenya-Third-Edition
- Gregory, Robert G. Quest for Equality: Asian Politics in East Africa, 1900-1967. Sangam Books, 1993. https://www.worldcat.org/title/quest-for-equality-asian-politics-in-east-africa-1900-1967/oclc/28930564
- Wrong, Michela. It's Our Turn to Eat: The Story of a Kenyan Whistle-Blower. HarperCollins, 2009. https://www.harpercollins.com/products/its-our-turn-to-eat-michela-wrong