The violence that preceded Kenya's December 1997 elections followed a similar pattern to the 1992 Rift Valley clashes but shifted geography: the Coast Province became the primary theater, with attacks targeting up-country (primarily Kikuyu, Luo, and Luhya) residents framed as defending "indigenous" coastal land rights. The violence killed hundreds, displaced tens of thousands, and once again demonstrated Daniel arap Moi's strategy of weaponizing ethnic grievance to fragment opposition and suppress voter turnout in anti-KANU areas. The 1997 violence also revealed how the impunity from 1992, no prosecutions, no accountability, had emboldened perpetrators and established state-sponsored ethnic cleansing as a viable electoral tactic.
The Coast violence began in August 1997, four months before the election, in Likoni (outside Mombasa), Kwale, and later spread to Kilifi districts. Armed groups, identifying as "coast indigenous peoples," attacked settlements and businesses owned by up-country Kenyans. The raiders, some wearing traditional regalia and others in organized units, used machetes, clubs, and bows and arrows to kill, burn homes, and drive residents from the area. The targets were clear: anyone perceived as non-coastal, which in practice meant Kikuyu shopkeepers, Luo workers, and Luhya farmers who had migrated to the Coast over decades.
The attackers' stated grievances centered on land and economic marginalization. They argued that coastal communities, the Mijikenda, Swahili, and Taita peoples, had been dispossessed of their land by up-country settlers who arrived after independence and monopolized commerce and employment. These grievances had basis in reality; coastal communities had indeed been economically marginalized, and land tenure issues remained unresolved. But the timing, just before elections, and the organizational sophistication of the attacks suggested political orchestration rather than spontaneous communal frustration.
Evidence of state involvement was substantial. Local KANU politicians, including MPs and councilors from coastal constituencies, were named in witness testimonies as having funded and organized the violence. The GSU and police were present during many attacks but intervened selectively, disarming victims while allowing attackers to proceed. In some cases, victims reported being told by police to leave the area "for their safety," effectively endorsing the displacement. Transport for raiders was provided by local government vehicles, and coordination meetings were allegedly held at KANU offices.
The political logic mirrored 1992: the Coast, like the Rift Valley, had increasingly voted for opposition parties. In the 1992 election, opposition candidates had won several coastal parliamentary seats, threatening KANU's dominance. By displacing up-country voters, who tended to support opposition parties, and intimidating remaining voters, KANU could recapture seats and reduce opposition presidential vote totals. The violence was voter suppression through ethnic terror, dressed up as indigenous rights advocacy.
The national opposition response was again fragmented. The opposition coalition that had formed to challenge Moi, including Raila Odinga's National Development Party, Mwai Kibaki's Democratic Party, and others, condemned the violence but could not agree on whether to boycott the election or demand postponement. International pressure was muted; donors had invested in the electoral process and were reluctant to call for cancellation. The election proceeded on schedule.
The December 29, 1997 election saw Moi win re-election with 40% of the vote, again a plurality in a divided field. Turnout in violence-affected areas was significantly depressed; many displaced persons never returned to vote, and those who remained were intimidated. Opposition candidates split the anti-Moi vote across ethnic lines: Kibaki (Kikuyu) received 31%, Raila (Luo) 11%, and others divided the remainder. KANU retained a parliamentary majority, though smaller than in 1992.
Post-election, a judicial commission of inquiry, the Akiwumi Commission, was established to investigate the violence. Its hearings documented state involvement, named politicians and administrators, and recommended prosecutions. The report was completed in 1999 but suppressed by Moi's government; it was not publicly released until after Moi left office in 2002. None of the individuals named were prosecuted during Moi's presidency. The impunity established in 1992 was reinforced in 1997, creating a precedent that would have catastrophic consequences in the 2007-2008 post-election violence.
The 1997 Coast violence also illustrated how ethnic grievances, real or manufactured, could be mobilized for elite political purposes. Coastal marginalization was genuine; decades of unequal development had left the region poor despite tourism revenues and port income. But the violence did not address these structural issues; it simply displaced poor up-country Kenyans, while coastal elites allied with Moi retained power and wealth. The pattern was consistent across both 1992 and 1997 violence: ordinary people from marginalized communities were mobilized to attack other ordinary people, while elites profited politically.
The long-term impact on the Coast was social fragmentation and economic disruption. Tourism, a critical industry, suffered as international warnings about violence deterred visitors. Trade declined as up-country merchants abandoned coastal markets. Inter-ethnic relations, previously characterized by relatively peaceful coexistence, were poisoned by memories of violence. The Coast's political economy remained dominated by the same networks that had organized the violence, ensuring that the region's marginalization persisted even as its residents were used as instruments of political violence.
The 1997 election violence, like its 1992 predecessor, demonstrated that Kenya's democratic transition was incomplete and contested. Elections were held, but the process was corrupted by violence, fraud, and manipulation. Moi remained president, but his legitimacy was eroded. The opposition gained experience and began building the coalitions that would eventually succeed in 2002. And the culture of electoral violence, unprosecuted and rewarded, became entrenched, a pattern that Kenya would struggle to break for decades.
See Also
- 1992 Election and Ethnic Violence
- Moi and the GSU
- Section 2A Repeal 1991
- Moi and Raila Odinga
- Electoral Violence in Kenya
- Coast Politics and Marginalization
- Kikuyu Internal Migration
- Impunity for Political Violence
Sources
- Kenya Human Rights Commission. Kayas of Deprivation, Kayas of Blood: Violence, Ethnicity and the State in Coastal Kenya. KHRC, 1997. https://www.khrc.or.ke/publications/
- Anderson, David M., and Emma Lochery. "Violence and Exodus in Kenya's Rift Valley, 2008: Predictable and Preventable?" Journal of Eastern African Studies 2, no. 2 (2008): 328-343. https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17531050802095536
- Republic of Kenya. Report of the Judicial Commission Appointed to Inquire into Tribal Clashes in Kenya (Akiwumi Report). Government Printer, 1999/2002. https://www.kenyalaw.org/kl/fileadmin/pdfdownloads/Akiwumi_Report.pdf